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Case No. 20131024-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
BENJAivHN DAVIu RETTIG, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals from guilty pleas to aggravated murder, a noncapital 
first degree felony, Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202; and aggravated kidnapping, a 
first degree felony, Utah Code Ann. §76-5-302. This Court would normally 
have jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(3)(i) (West 2009). But this 
Court lacks jurisdiction to review Defendant's guilty pleas because he did not 
pursue a timely motion to withdraw them. See State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, 148, 
114 P.3d 585 (deadline for filing motion to withdraw plea is" a constitutionally 
permissible jurisdictional bar"). 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant held the bound victim at gunpoint while Defendant's friend 
slit the victim's throat and stabbed him in the base of his neck. Defendant then 
helped bind the victim's son and daughter-in-law and held them at gunpoint 
while his friend stole the victim's guns. The State charged Defendant with 
several felonies, including capital murder, and intended to seek a death 
sentence. It later agreed to relinquish a possible death sentence in exchange for 
Defendant's guilty pleas to aggravated murder and aggravated kidnapping. 
Defendant asks this Court to review the validity of his pleas for several 
reasons, including that his counsel were ineffective because they allegedly 
incorrectly explained accomplice liability, allowed him to plead based on an 
inaccurate factual basis, and pressured him to accept the plea offer. Although 
Defendant filed a timely pro se motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, he 
abandoned that motion after conferring with new counsel. 
In a long, unbroken line of unanimous opinions, this Court has held that 
Utah Code §77-13-6(2)(b) (Plea Withdrawal Statute) imposes a constitutionally 
permissible jurisdictional deadline on challenges to guilty pleas. Defendant 
asks this Court to overrule this precedent because, he contends, it denies him 
the opportunity to raise on direct appeal claims that his counsel were ineffective 
during the plea process. 
-2- G 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. This Court has unequivocally held and repeatedly reaffirmed that the 
Plea Withdrawal Statute's deadline is a constitutionally permissible 
jurisdictional bar. Should this Court overrule that precedent? 
Standard of Review. Whether a statute is constitutional and whether a 
court has subject matter jurisdiction are questions of iaw. State v. Maestas, 2012 
UT 46, ,r337, 299 P.3d 892 (constitutional issues); State v. Nicholls, 2006 UT 76, 
,r3, 148 P.3d 990 Gurisdiction). 
2. Assuming that this Court has jurisdiction to review the validity of 
Defendant's pleas, has he shown that his counsel was ineffective during the 
initial plea process, or in advising him to withdraw his pro se motion to 
withdraw his pleas? 
Standard of Review. Defendant filed a motion for remand under rule 23B, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to create develop additional evidence on 
this issue. As explained in the State's accompanying response to that motion, 
this Court should deny a remand because this Court lacks jurisdiction to 
consider the issue, and, in any event, Defendant has not carried his burden of 
establishing the existence of nonspeculative extra-record facts that, if proven, 
would prove his ineffectiveness claims. Absent a remand, ineffective assistance 
-3-
claims raised for the first time on appeal are questions of law. See State v. 
Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ,r11, 328 P.3d 841. 
3. If this Court has jurisdiction to consider the validity of Defendant's 
pleas, did the trial court plainly err in accepting the factual basis for those 
pleas? 
Standard of Review. Plain error requires a showing of obvious, prejudicial 
error. State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, if 55, 326 P.3d 645. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Addendum A contains copies of: 
Utah Const. art. I, §12 (rights of accused persons); 
Utah Const. art. VIII, §3 (supreme court jurisdiction); 
Utah Const. art. VIII, §4 (rulemaking power of supreme court); 
Utah Const. art. VIII, §5 (district court jurisdiction); 
Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6 (West Supp. 2015) (plea withdrawal); and 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-109 (West 2009) (appointment of pro bono 
counsel). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of f acts. 1 
Defendant and his friend, Martin Bond, arrived at Kay Mortensen' s home 
with a handgun, zip ties, ski masks, and latex gloves. They planned to steal 
1 The fact summary is based on the factual basis for Defendant's pleas 
recited in his plea affidavit. R60-59. 
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Mortensen' s guns. They entered Mortensen' s home uninvited, bound 
Mortensen' s hands with zip ties, and demanded that he show them where he 
kept his guns. Mortensen led them to a bunker behind his home and showed 
them several guns. R60. 
The two led Mortensen back to his home and into his upstairs bathroom. 
Defendant held Mortensen at gunpoint with the one handgun he and Bond had 
brought. Bond instructed Mortensen to kneel next to his bathtub with his back 
to Defendant and Bond. R60. 
Defendant watched as Bond displayed a knife, but then returned it to his 
pocket. Bond then went downstairs and returned with a ten- to twelve-inch-
long knife. As Defendant continued to hold Mortensen at gunpoint, Bond slit 
Mortensen's throat and stabbed him in the base of his neck. R60. 
Shortly thereafter, Mortensen' s son Roger and his wife Pamela knocked 
on the front door. Defendant hid behind the door with the handgun while 
Bond opened the door and admitted Roger and Pamela. Defendant and Bond 
forced Roger and Pamela into the living room and bound their hands and feet 
with zip ties. Bond then retrieved another knife from the kitchen, but 
Defendant told Bond not to kill Roger and Pamela. R60. 
Defendant held Roger and Pamela at gunpoint while Bond stole 
approximately twenty-five of Mortensen' s handguns and rifles. Together, 
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Defendant and Bond also stole some of Mortensen' s ammunition. They took 
Roger's driver's license and threatened to kill Roger and Pamela if they 
implicated Defendant and Bond in the crimes. R60-59. 
After the murder, Defendant and Bond together discarded evidence and 
buried the stolen guns. R59. When police later confronted them, both Rettig 
and Bond admitted their involvement in the murder, burglary, and kidnapping. 
R2. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
The plea agreement 
The State charged Defendant with one count of aggravated murder, a 
capital offense; one count of aggravated burglary, a first degree felony; and two 
counts of aggravated kidnapping, also first degree felonies. RS-3. 
The parties reached a plea agreement. R62-53;R410. Defendant agreed to 
plead guilty to aggravated murder and one count of aggravated kidnapping. 
R57;R410:3. He also agreed to testify truthfully against Bond if called at Bond's 
trial. R57;R410:9. In exchange, the State agreed: 
• not to seek the death penalty; 
• to recommend a sentence of 25 years to life with the possibility of parole 
on the aggravated murder count; 
• to recommend that the sentences on both counts run concurrently; and 
• to dismiss the aggravated burglary and the other aggravated kidnapping 
count. 
-6-
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R57;R410:3. Three attorneys represented Defendant during the plea process. 
R22,30,59. 
The plea affidavit 
Defendant signed a plea affidavit in support of his guilty pleas. R62-55 
(the plea affidavit is Addendum B). In that affidavit, Defendant affirmed that 
he understood the elements of the crimes to which he was pleading, their 
maximum punishments, and their factual bases. R62-56. As part of the 
elements of aggravated murder, the affidavit stated that Defendant was 
admitting that he "intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another or 
intentionally aided another person to intentionally or knowingly cause the 
death of another. ... " R61. 
The plea affidavit contains a detailed explanation of the factual basis for 
Defendant's pleas. R60-59. As to the aggravated murder count, it explained 
that: 
• both Defendant and Bond led Mortensen - bound with zip ties - to the 
bathroom and that Bond instructed Mortensen to kneel over the bathtub; 
• Defendant held Mortensen at gunpoint while Bond displayed a knife, 
returned it to his pocket, went down stairs, and returned with a different, 
presumably larger, knife; 
• Defendant continued to hold Mortensen at gunpoint while he "observed 
Bond take the knife and slice Mortensen's throat" and stab Mortensen in 
the base of his neck. 
-7-
R60. 
The affidavit states that Defendant continued to take an active role in the 
crimes after Mortensen's murder. R60-59. Defendant held the handgun while 
he and Bond bound Roger and Pamela with zip ties and Bond stole Mortensen' s 
guns. R60. Defendant also helped Bond steal Mortensen' s ammunition, take 
Roger's driver's license, threaten Roger and Pamela with death, dispose of 
evidence, and hide the stolen guns. R59. 
Defendant affirmed in his plea affidavit that he was waiving several 
constitutional rights, including his "right to appeal [his] conviction." R58. The 
affidavit detailed the conditions of the plea agreement, including that 
Defendant agreed to testify if called at Bond's trial. R57. 
Defendant declared that he was entering his plea of his "own free will 
and choice" and that no "force, threats, [or] unlawful influence of any kind" 
had influenced his decision. R57. He further declared that he had read the 
affidavit or had it read to him and that he understood it. R57. 
In the paragraph immediately preceding his signature, Defendant 
affirmed that he understood that if he wished to withdraw his guilty plea, he 
had to do so by motion filed "before sentence is announced." R57. He also 
confirmed that he knew that "any challenge to [his] plea(s) made after 
sentencing must be pursued under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act .... " R56. 
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The plea hearing 
At the plea hearing, counsel explained the plea agreement. R410:3-4 (the 
plea hearing transcript is Addendum C). Defendant confirmed that his counsel 
had accurately explained the agreement and that he understood the 
consequences of accepting that agreement and pleading guilty. R410:3-4. 
Defendant then took an oath to tell the truth. R410:5. 
The court explained that it was responsible to "confirm" that Defendant 
understood "everything that's happening and all the consequences of your 
pleas today." R410:5. The court instructed Defendant to alert the court if he did 
not understand something, or needed more time to confer with counsel, and 
that discussions with counsel could be conducted in private. R410:5. 
Defendant denied that anyone had "forced, threatened or coerced" him 
"in any way" into entering his pleas. R410:6. Defendant denied that his plea 
was based on any promises not already explained on the record. R410:6. 
Defendant also assured the court that he had received an adequate 
opportunity to "clearly discuss" the agreement with counsel, that he 
understood it terms, and that he understood the charges and possible penalties. 
R410:7-9. In fact, the court took a recess to allow counsel to clarify with 
Defendant the penalties for aggravated kidnapping. R410:8-9. 
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The court then reviewed the elements of aggravated murder and 
aggravated kidnapping and Defendant confirmed that he understood them. 
R410:10-17,22. Both defense counsel and the prosecutor explained that 
Defendant was admitting his guilt as an accomplice to aggravated murder 
because he "intentionally aid[ed]" Martin Bond to commit aggravated murder. 
R410:ll. 
Defendant again assured the court that he had received "an adequate 
opportunity" to discuss his pleas with his three counsel, that counsel had 
answered all his questions, and that he was "fully satisfied" with his counsel's 
representation and advice. R410:17-18. 
Defendant confirmed that he had received a copy of the plea affidavit 
several weeks before the hearing and had read the entire affidavit "multiple 
times" "paragraph by paragraph." R410:18. Defendant specifically confirmed 
that he had reviewed the elements of aggravated murder and aggravated 
kidnapping in the affidavit. R410:18. 
Defendant also assured the court that he understood the evidence that the 
State would present at trial, and that the evidence created "a substantial 
chance" that he would be convicted on both counts. R410:19. Defense counsel 
explained that he had reviewed the evidence with Defendant "on several 
occasions." R410:19-20. Counsel also explained that he had conducted an 
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independent investigation, had an investigator meet personally with 
Defendant, and that he had provided Defendant with additional evidence that 
his investigator had uncovered. R410:20. Defendant did not dispute counsel's 
representations. R410:19-20. 
Before explaining the rights that Defendant would waive by pleading 
guilty, the court exhorted Defendant to "listen carefully" and to alert the court 
if he did not understand something. R410:20. The court reminded Defendant 
that he could confer privately with counsel. R410:20. 
The court then reviewed the rights that Defendant would waive by 
pleading guilty. R410:20-27. They included the right to appeal his conviction 
and to have an attorney's assistance in that appeal. R410:26. Defendant assured 
the court that he understood that his pleas would waive those rights. R410:26. 
The court also explained the possible penalties and their consequences, and 
Defendant stated that he understood. R410:27-28. 
Defendant confirmed that he understood that if he wished to withdraw 
his pleas, he had to file a motion "before sentence is announced." R410:28. 
Defendant assured the court that he had no questions about his pleas. R410:28. 
The prosecutor then stated the factual basis for the pleas. R410:28-29. 
Although the court noted that Defendant had already reviewed the factual basis 
in the affidavit, the court instructed Defendant to "listen carefully" to the 
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prosecutor's recitation because the court would later ask if "everything" the 
prosecutor said was true. R410:29. Defendant agreed to alert the court if the 
prosecutor said "anything" that was "not true or accurate." R410:29. The 
prosecutor then recited the factual basis essentially as stated in the plea 
affidavit. R60-59;R410:29-31. When asked whether the prosecutor's description 
was "true and accurate," Defendant responded, "Yes, sir." R410:31-32. 
Defendant signed the plea affidavit and confirmed that the pleas were in 
his best interest. R410:32. Defendant pied guilty to both counts. R410:32-33. 
The court found that Defendant had read and "fully" understood the affidavit 
and that, based on the affidavit and colloquy, Defendant understood the 
elements of the offenses and the relationship between the facts and the 
elements. R410:33-34. 
The court also found that the pleas were supported by a sufficient factual 
basis. R410:33-34. The court therefore found that Defendant had entered his 
pleas "knowingly and voluntarily." R410:33-34. The court set sentencing for 19 
July 2011, just over six weeks after the plea hearing. R410:35. 
-12-
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Defendant files, then abandons a motion to withdraw his pleas 
In a pro se letter filed 15 July 2011, Defendant asked to withdraw his 
pleas.2 RllS-13 (a copy of the letter is Addendum D). Defendant alleged that: 
• his attorneys had never asked him for an "entire statement" of the facts; 
• he had argued with his attorneys about discovery and they did not 
provide him with all discovery until after the plea hearing; 
• counsel's investigator did not tell counsel everything Defendant had told 
the investigator about the case; 
• the factual basis in the plea affidavit was not true, and although 
Defendant asked his counsel to tell the prosecutor his version of the 
events, they did not do so; and 
• his counsel "pressured" him into pleading guilty. 
RllS-14. 
Meanwhile, the court continued the sentencing hearing at defense 
counsel's request to allow counsel time to correct errors in the Pre-Sentence 
Investigation (PSI) report. R112-111;124. 
After receiving Defendant's pro se letter, the court allowed plea counsel 
to withdraw and appointed new counsel. R132. The court ordered new counsel 
to file a substitute motion to withdraw Defendant's pleas by 6 December 2011. 
R139. 
2 The letter is dated 4 February 2011, but that date cannot be correct 
because it is nearly four months before the plea hearing. R115. 
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On December 6th, Defendant appeared with new counsel and withdrew 
his motion to withdraw his plea. R142. The court set sentencing for 13 
December 2011. R142. Defendant has chosen not to include the transcript of 
the 6 December 2011 hearing in the appellate record. 
Sentencing 
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel explained Defendant's 
reasons for abandoning his motion to withdraw. R411:23-25 (Addendum E is 
the sentencing transcript). Counsel explained that Defendant's initial desire to 
withdraw his pleas was based on a "misunderstanding of the application of 
certain legal terminologies" and "false impression[s]" created by Defendant's 
discussions with "jailhouse lawyers" after pleading guilty. R411:23. Counsel 
explained that he met with Defendant and discussed Defendant's version of the 
facts. R411:23-25. Counsel then drafted an affidavit that stated Defendant's 
version of the facts and gave Defendant an opportunity to make any 
corrections. R411:24-25. Defendant made no corrections. R411:24-25. Counsel 
then explained the law in relation to Defendant's version of the facts, and 
specifically discussed the defenses of duress and coercion. R411:24. 
Counsel explained that he answered Defendant's concerns about the 
validity of his pleas "without brow-beating" during a "very candid, very open" 
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discussion where some of counsel's staff were also present. R411:24-25. 
Defendant did not dispute counsel's representations. R411:25-32. 
Counsel argued that in addition to other mitigating circumstances, the 
~ court should find that Defendant was a "less active participant in the crime." 
R411:2-3. The court refused to do so. R183;R411:6-7. 
The court sentenced Defendant to imprisonment for twenty-five years to 
life for aggravated murder and fifteen years to life for aggravated kidnapping, 
to run concurrently. R194-93;R411:30. The court observed that even according 
to Defendant's version, he was "the most powerful person" in Mortensen' s 
home that night because he held the handgun that he and Bond had brought 
with them. R411:28. The court observed that Defendant could have used that 
gun to protect Mortensen, or to "empower Mr. Bond to commit murder," and 
~ that Defendant unfortunately" chose the latter." R411:28. 
Motion to reinstate appellate rights 
On 4 January 2012, twenty-two days after Defendant's sentence was 
entered, Defendant's counsel sent him a letter instructing him to contact counsel 
if he wished to appeal. R192-91,243. On 19 January 2012, thirty-seven days 
after his sentence was entered, counsel filed a notice of appeal. R202. The court 
of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. R229. 
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Defendant filed a pro se motion to reinstate his appellate rights. R247-31. 
He cited to rule 4(£), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Manning v. State, 
2005 UT 61, 122 P.3d 628, and attached copies of relevant documents. R247-31. 
The court then appointed new counsel, who filed a substitute motion to 
reinstate the time for appeal. R287,303-290. After a hearing, the court granted 
the motion and reinstated Defendant's time to appeal. R396-90. Based on that 
order, Defendant timely appealed. R401. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. This Court should not overrule its long line of unanimous decisions 
holding that the Plea Withdrawal Statute's deadline is a constitutionally 
permissible jurisdictional bar. Defendant has not shown that these decisions 
lack weight, analysis, or supporting authority. On the contrary, the Utah 
constitution expressly grants the Legislature authority to regulate access to both 
trial and appellate court jurisdiction. And the Legislature can control the 
circumstances under which a defendant can withdraw a guilty plea because the 
right to plead guilty is a statutorily-created right. 
Defendant argues that the statute is unconstitutional because it denies 
him the right to appeal guaranteed by article 1, §12 of the Utah Constitution by 
preventing him from arguing in the trial court or on direct appeal that his 
counsel was ineffective during the plea process. On the contrary, the statute 
-16-
G 
. -:\ 
\®I 
does not deny defendants the opportunity to challenge their plea counsel's 
effectiveness in their criminal case or on direct appeal. Rather, it merely 
requires defendants to do so in a timely manner. When they do, they are 
Ga entitled to the assistance of counsel. When they do not, they must pursue their 
claims under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) without a right to the 
effective assistance of counsel. Although he argues that requiring him to 
proceed without a right to counsel is unfair, Defendant has not demonstrated 
that he has a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel to pursue 
an untimely challenge to his pleas. 
Nor has Defendant shown that this Court's interpretation of the Plea 
Withdrawal Statute works poorly. The statute gives weight to a guilty plea. 
And by preventing a defendant from previewing his sentence before filing a 
~ motion to withdraw his plea, the statute discourages motions to withdraw 
based only on dissatisfaction with the sentence or similar concerns unrelated to 
an actual defect in the plea. Both considerations, in turn, give weight to the 
State's, the judiciary's, and crime victims' interests in finality. The statute also 
provides an appropriately limited avenue for relief for defendants who miss its 
deadline - a petition under the PCRA. 
Defendant's remaining arguments are unpersuasive. The United States 
Supreme Court cases on which Defendant relies say nothing about the forum or 
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procedure, if any, that a State must provide for challenging a guilty plea. 
Defendant also lacks standing to challenge the statute on the ground that it 
prevents defendants from obtaining relief for claims of ineffective assistance 
that do not render the plea unknowing or involuntary, because he was not 
denied relief on that ground. In any event, the statute does not prevent relief 
on that ground because such relief is available under the PCRA. 
II. This Court lacks jurisdiction to review Defendant's challenges to his 
pleas based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Alternatively, 
Defendant has not carried his burden to show that his plea counsel were 
deficient because the record shows that they were not. The claims also fail for 
lack of prejudice because Defendant has not offered any defense to the charges. 
Therefore, he has not demonstrated that it would have been rational under the 
circumstances to reject the plea offer, go to trial, and face the possibility of a 
death sentence that the plea avoided. 
III. This Court also lacks jurisdiction to review Defendant's claim that 
the trial court plainly erred by accepting his guilty plea to aggravated murder. 
In any event, Defendant demonstrates no error. 
Defendant argues that the factual basis was insufficient because it 
established that he only witnessed Bond commit aggravated murder, not that 
he intended that Mortensen die. On the contrary, the factual basis sufficiently 
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established that Defendant understood that Bond intended to kill Mortensen, or 
that Defendant at least knew that Bond was doing so. 
IV. If Defendant establishes that his constitutional right to appeal has 
vj been denied and that his counsel were ineffective, then the appropriate 
procedural remedy is to vacate his plea so that the State can retry him on the 
original charges and possibly seek the death penalty or a sentence of life 
without parole. 
Moreover, if the jurisdictional deadline in the Plea Withdrawal Statute is 
unconstitutional, then all guilty pleas that have not previously been challenged 
will become open to challenge. 
ARGUMENT 
Properly administered plea bargains benefit "all concerned," specifically, 
defendants, prosecutors, courts, victims, and the public. See Blackledge v. 
Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977). The II advantages" of plea bargaining "can be 
~ secured, however, only if dispositions by guilty plea are accorded a great 
measure of finality." Id. Allowing II indiscriminate" challenges to guilty pleas 
"would eliminate the chief virtues of the plea system speed, economy, and 
finality." Id. 
Nevertheless, "no procedural device for the taking of guilty pleas is so 
perfect in design and exercise as to warrant a per se rule rendering it 'uniformly 
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invulnerable to subsequent challenge."' Id. at 73 (quoting Fontaine v. United 
States, 411 U.S. 213, 215 (1973)). Thus, defendants must have some mechanism 
for raising legitimate challenges to their guilty pleas. See id. at 71-74. 
In a long, unbroken line of unanimous opinions, this Court has 
recognized that Utah Code §77-13-6 (Plea Withdrawal Statute) strikes the 
appropriate balance between a Defendant's right to challenge his guilty plea 
and the State's, victims', and the judiciary' s interest in finality. This Court has 
held that a defendant's failure to timely pursue a motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea deprives both trial and appellate courts of jurisdiction to consider direct 
challenges to that plea. See, e.g., State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, ,1s, 247 P.3d 344; State 
v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, ,,13-20, 114 P.3d 525. Nevertheless, defendants who 
miss the deadline may still challenge their guilty plea, but must do so under the 
PCRA. Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6(2)(b). 
Defendant argues that this Court should overrule this precedent because 
the Plea Withdrawal Statute's jurisdictional deadline denies him the right to 
appeal guaranteed in article 1 §12 of the Utah Constitution. Rep.Br.Aplt.18-22. 
Defendant contends that his state constitutional right to appeal should allow 
him to challenge his guilty plea on direct appeal when his counsel were 
ineffective during the plea process. Rep.Br.Aplt.18-31. Defendant asserts that 
the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 
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(2010); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012), and Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 
(2012), undermine the rule that the statutory jurisdictional deadline is 
constitutional. Rep.Br.Aplt.19-20. 
Defendant also argues that it is unfair to require defendants who miss the 
statutory jurisdictional deadline to pursue their guilty plea challenges under the 
PCRA because defendants are not entitled to the effective assistance of counsel 
in those proceedings. Rep.Br.Aplt.26-27. He further contends that his counsel 
were ineffective during the plea process, and that the trial court plainly erred in 
accepting his guilty pleas because they were not supported by an adequate 
factual basis. Rep.Br.Aplt.31-47. Because his ineffectiveness claims rely on 
extra-record facts, Defendant has also moved for remand under rule 23B, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, to develop a factual record to support his 
~ ineffectiveness claims. 
Defendant has not carried his heavy burden to show that this Court 
should overrule its precedent. Because this Court lacks jurisdiction, it cannot 
consider his ineffective assistance of counsel and plain error challenges to his 
guilty pleas. 
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I. 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT CARRIED HIS SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN TO 
SHOW THAT THIS COURT SHOULD OVERRULE ITS PRECEDENT 
INTERPRETING THE PLEA WITHDRAWAL STATUTE BECAUSE THE 
STATUTE DOES NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DENY DEFENDANTS 
THE RIGHT To APPEAL 
The Plea Withdrawal Statute balances a defendant's right to challenge his 
guilty plea with the benefits of finality by requiring a defendant to move to 
withdraw his guilty plea "before sentence is announced." Utah Code Ann. §77-
13-6(2)(b) (West Supp. 2015). A defendant who misses this deadline is not 
without a remedy, however. The statute provides that any "challenge to a 
guilty plea not made within the time period specified in [the statute] shall be 
pursued under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and Rule 
65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. §77-13-6(2)(c). 
This provision is not a procedural rule. Rather, as this Court has 
consistently held, it is a substantive provision that defines a court's jurisdiction 
to hear a challenge to a guilty plea and concomitantly determines whether a 
defendant has the right to the assistance of counsel in that challenge. 
Because Defendant asks the Court to overrule this precedent, he has "a 
substantial burden of persuasion." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 
1994). Generally, this Court will overrule its precedent only if it lacks weight, 
analysis, and supporting authority, and if it works poorly. Id. at 399-400. 
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Defendant has not shown that this Court's precedent interpreting the Plea 
~ Withdrawal Statute fits that bill. 
A. This Court has consistently and unanimously recognized that the 
Plea Withdrawal Statute's deadline defines when and in what 
proceeding the courts have jurisdiction to consider a challenge to 
a guilty plea. 
This Court has unequivocally held and repeatedly reaffirmed that, failing 
@ to timely move to withdraw a guilty plea-or, as in this case, failing to pursue a 
timely-filed motion- deprives both trial and appellate courts of jurisdiction in 
to consider the validity of the plea in the criminal proceeding. See State v. Ott, 
2010 UT 1, 118, 247 P.3d 344; State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, 1110-14, 167 P.3d 
1046; Grimmett v. State, 2007 UT 11, 118, 25, 152 P.3d 306; State v. Nicholls, 2006 
UT 76, 116-7, 148 P.3d 990; State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, 1113-20, 114 P.3d 525; 
State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, if 3, 40 P.3d 630. See also State v. Mullins, 2005 UT 43, 
,r11 n.2, 116 P.3d 374 (" As Merrill makes clear," untimely motions to withdraw 
a plea "deprive[] the district court of jurisdiction to entertain those motions"); 
~ State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993) (under former version of plea 
statute, right to withdraw plea "extinguished" once time for moving to 
withdraw expires). 
In Rhinehart, this Court specifically held that the Plea Withdrawal 
Statute's jurisdictional deadline applies to claims that trial counsel's 
ineffectiveness resulted in an invalid plea or in the failure to timely move to 
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withdraw the plea. See 2007 UT 61, ,r,rl0-14. This Court rejected Rhinehart's 
claim that the Plea Withdrawal Statute's deadline "deprive[ d] her of her right to 
appeal" even though she alleged that "the ineffectiveness of her trial counsel 
caused her to enter her plea and to fail to bring a timely motion to withdraw it." 
Id. ,r11. This Court observed that recognizing an exception to the statute's 
jurisdictional deadline for ineffective assistance of counsel claims would "vitiate 
section 77-13-6." Id. if 14. This is because a defendant could always attribute an 
alleged flaw in his plea to his counsel's representation. Id. if 13. 
Defendant has not shown that this precedent lacks weight or support, or 
that it works poorly. To the contrary, it is well supported by the plain language 
of the statute and relevant constitutional provisions, and it properly balances 
the competing interests of finality and access to a forum to raise valid 
challenges to a plea. 
B. The statute's jurisdictional deadline does not deprive Defendant 
of an opportunity to argue on direct appeal that his counsel's 
ineffectiveness invalidated his guilty plea. 
Defendant contends that the Plea Withdrawal Statute is unconstitutional 
because it prevents him from arguing on direct appeal that his counsel was 
ineffective during the plea process. Rep.Br.Aplt.21,23-24. Defendant claims 
that the statute "bar[ s] a defendant who pleads guilty ... from vindicating his 
right to assistance of counsel." Rep.Br.Aplt.21; see also Rep.Br.Aplt.23 (arguing 
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that the statute, "blocks [his] ability to assert his Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel"). Defendant misunderstands the statute. 
The statute does not prevent a defendant from arguing in his criminal 
i:i> case that his trial counsel's ineffectiveness invalidates his plea. Nor does it 
prevent a defendant from directly appealing an adverse ruling on that issue. 
On the contrary, as the history of this case illustrates, defendants may move in 
the trial court to withdraw their plea on the ground that their counsel was 
ineffective and then, on direct appeal, challenge any adverse ruling on that 
motion, all the while proceeding with the assistance of counsel of right. 
Defendant here filed a timely pro se motion to withdraw his plea 
claiming that his initial counsel were ineffective during the plea process. RllS-
13 (Add. D). Defendant could have pursued that motion and been allowed to 
withdraw his guilty plea had he established that his counsel's ineffectiveness 
invalidated his plea. See Utah Code Ann. §76-13-6(2)(a). The trial court 
appointed him new counsel to help him do so. R132. If the trial court had 
denied his motion to withdraw, Defendant could have appealed that ruling, 
again with the assistance of counsel. But Defendant instead chose to withdraw 
the motion to withdraw his pleas explaining through counsel that the motion 
had been based on bad advice other inmates gave him at the jail. R142;R411:23-
25 (Add. E). 
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Thus, enforcing the statute's jurisdictional deadline does not deny 
Defendant the right to yet another counsel to challenge his plea counsel's 
performance in this direct appeal. Rather, Defendant waived that opportunity 
by abandoning his timely filed motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, even 
though he knew that by doing so, he could only challenge his guilty pleas 
under the PCRA. R57-56;R411:18. 
Defendant argues that his waiver of his right to appeal, made in 
conjunction with entering his guilty pleas, should not prevent him from 
challenging his plea counsel's ineffectiveness in this appeal. Rep.Br.Aplt.25. 
But that is not what blocks his right to challenge counsel's representation in the 
plea process. 
Again, Defendant cannot challenge his pleas here because he withdrew 
the motion he filed within the Plea Withdrawal Statute's jurisdictional deadline. 
That deprived this Court of jurisdiction to consider his guilty pleas on direct 
appeal. 
And the statute does not prevent Defendant from challenging his plea 
counsel's performance. It merely requires him to now do so under the PCRA. 
The PCRA allows a Defendant to obtain relief from a conviction on the basis 
that his counsel were ineffective during the plea process. See Utah Code Ann. 
§78B-9-104(1)(d) (West Supp. 2015) (allowing for post-conviction relief from a 
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criminal conviction on the ground that ~' the petitioner had ineffective assistance 
G;;> of counsel"). Enforcing the statute's jurisdictional deadline therefore does not 
deny Defendant the opportunity to challenge his pleas based on counsel's 
Ci alleged ineffective assistance. It merely requires him to do so within the 
confines of the PCRA and without the right to the effective assistance of 
counsel. 
Defendant also argues that his substitute counsel was ineffective for 
advising him to abandon his motion to withdraw his pleas. Rep.Br.Aplt.41-42. 
But as explained, this Court has held that a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel relating to the plea cannot circumvent the statute's jurisdictional bar. 
See Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, 'if 14. That holding is correct for the reasons explained 
below, including that defendants who -miss the statute's jurisdictional deadline 
can still challenge their pleas under the PCRA. Although Defendant complains 
that he will not be entitled to counsel under the PCRA, that does not render the 
statutory deadline unconstitutional. Defendants are not constitutionally 
entitled to counsel any time they wish to challenge their trial counsel's 
performance. 
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C. Article 8 §§ 3 and 5 of the Utah Constitution grant the Legislature 
authority to regulate a defendant's opportunity to challenge his 
guilty plea. 
The Legislature may properly regulate the timing, scope, and, in some 
cases, the proceeding in which a defendant may challenge his guilty pleas. The 
Utah Constitution vests the Legislature with authority to regulate access to trial 
and appellate jurisdiction. Moreover, because the right to plead guilty is a 
statutory right, the Legislature may regulate the scope of that right. 
1. The Legislature has constitutional authority to regulate access 
to trial and appellate court jurisdiction. 
Because the Legislature has constitutional authority to regulate access to 
trial and appellate court jurisdiction, the Plea Withdrawal Statute's deadline is a 
"constitutionally permissible" prerequisite for invoking this Court's appellate 
jurisdiction. See Merrill, 2005 UT 34, ,I48. Although Reyes, Merrill, and Rhinehart 
did not expressly base their holdings on these constitutional provisions, these 
provisions undergird those holdings. 
"'[S]ubject matter jurisdiction is the authority granted through 
constitution or statute to adjudicate a class of cases or controversies."' Chen v. 
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ,I35 n.6, 100 P.3d 1177 (quoting Morrison v. Bestler, 387 
S.E.2d 753, 755 (1990) (abrogated in part on other grounds by State v. Nielsen, 2014 
UT 10, if if 40-41, 326 P.3d 645); see also Matter of Estate of McLaughlin, 754 P.2d 
679, 681-82 (Utah App. 1988) (" A court has subject matter jurisdiction if the case 
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is one of the type of cases the court has been empowered to entertain by the 
constitution or statute from which the court derives its authority.") (citing 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments §11 (1982)). 
A court "cannot conjure jurisdiction." State v. Lara, 2005 UT 70, 110, 124 
P.3d 243. Thus, for example, this Court had no jurisdiction before 1984 to 
answer a question of state law certified from a federal district court, because the 
then "current language of our constitution" granted no jurisdiction to do so. See 
Holden v. NL Indus., Inc., 629 P.2d 428, 430-32 (Utah 1981). 
Article VIII, section 3 of the Utah Constitution defines this Court's 
original jurisdiction, but gives the Legislature authority to regulate access to its 
appellate jurisdiction: 
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all 
extraordinary writs and to answer questions of state law certified 
by a court of the United States. The Supreme Court shall have 
appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be exercised as 
provided by statute. 
Utah Const. art. VIII, §3. Because this Court's appellate jurisdiction is ,.,to be 
exercised as provided by statute," the Legislature can determine how litigants 
access that jurisdiction. Id. 
Article VIII, section 5 addresses district court jurisdiction and the 
jurisdiction of any other statutorily-created court, such as the Utah Court of 
Appeals. That section grants the Legislature authority to limit the district 
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court's original jurisdiction and to completely define the Utah Court of 
Appeals' jurisdiction: 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters 
except as limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to 
issue all extraordinary writs .... The jurisdiction of all other courts, 
both original and appellate, shall be provided by statute. Except 
for matters filed originally with the Supreme Court, there shall be 
in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction 
to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the case. 
Utah Const. art. VIII, §5. 
These constitutional provisions expressly empower the Legislature to 
regulate access to or, in some cases, completely define trial and appellate court 
jurisdiction. That is all that the Plea Withdrawal Statute does. It does not 
extinguish a right to challenge a plea or to appeal the denial of that challenge. It 
only regulates when and in what proceeding the challenge may be raised. 
Defendant argues that in Weaver v. Kimball, 202 P. 9, 10 (Utah 1921), this 
Court recognized II an unqualified right of appeal regardless of the plea entered." 
Rep.Br.Aplt.22-23,28 (Defendant's emphasis). But Defendant ignores Weaver's 
critical qualifier: 11 Of course, the appeal must be taken within such limitations 
and restrictions as to time and orderly procedure as the Legislature may 
prescribe." Weaver, 202 P. at 10. 
In sum, the foundation for this Court's holdings that the Plea Withdrawal 
Statute imposes a jurisdictional deadline is not merely this Court's 
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interpretation of the statutory language, or judicial gloss on that language. 
Rather, those holdings necessarily flow from the Utah Constitution's express 
grant of authority to the Legislature to regulate access to both district and 
appellate court jurisdiction. This Court's recognition that the Legislature has 
created a jurisdictional deadline for challenges to a guilty plea is weighty, well-
founded precedent. 
2. The Plea Withdrawal Statute creates a substantive rule, not a 
procedural one. 
Defendant argues that the Legislature "exceeded its bounds" by enacting 
the Plea Withdrawal Statute because it is a procedural rule. Rep.Br.Aplt.29. He 
argues Utah Constitution article VIII, section 4 grants this Court the authority to 
adopt procedural rules and allows the Legislature the authority only to amend 
procedural rules by a two-thirds vote. Rep.Br.Aplt.29. 
The Plea Withdrawal Statute is not a procedural rule. It is a substantive 
statute with an essential procedural component that allocates access to trial and 
appellate court jurisdiction. This is precisely why this Court refused to apply 
the statute retroactively in State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993). 
Procedural statutes can be applied retroactively, but substantive statutes - like 
those that affect jurisdiction or substantive rights-cannot. See id. Indeed, this 
Court has long-recognized that the Plea Withdrawal Statute is substantive 
rather than procedural because, while" designed to control judicial processes," 
-31-
the statute II also [has] some impact on vested rights." Salt Lake Child & Family 
Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 n.3 (Utah 1995) (citing Abeyta, 
852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993)). 
Substantive statutes can include procedural components. See State v. Drej, 
2010 UT 35, ,I30, 233 P.3d 476. For example, in Drej, the defendant argued that 
the special mitigation statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-5-205.5, violated Utah's 
separation of powers clause because, by placing the burden to prove special 
mitigation on the defendant, the Legislature enacted a procedural rule 1n 
violation of article VIII, section 4. This Court disagreed. 2010 UT 35, ,J31. It 
recognized that while allocating the burden of proof could be characterized as a 
procedural component of the statute," a procedural rule may be so intertwined 
with a substantive right that the court must view it as substantive." Id. ,I30. 
This Court therefore concluded that even if the burden of proof component of 
the statute were procedural, it could not be separated from the substantive right 
to which it attached-the right to argue that special mitigation should reduce 
murder to manslaughter-"without leaving the right or duty created 
meaningless." Id. if 31. 
Likewise, the deadline for filing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not 
procedural. Rather, it determines which court has jurisdiction to hear a 
challenge to a plea. The legislature imposed that deadline as a matter of its 
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prerogative to regulate jurisdiction and to determine how best to allocate the 
State's financial resources. Defendant therefore mischaracterizes the Plea 
Withdrawal Statute as a procedural rule. 
But even if the Plea Withdrawal Statute were purely procedural, the 
legislature properly enacted it by a super-majority. Article 8, section 4 allows 
the legislature to II amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the 
Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature." Utah Const. art. VIII, § 4. The Utah House and Senate both 
unanimously passed the statute. Utah House Journal, 55th Utah Leg., Gen. 
Sess., Day 40 at 23 (28 February 2003) (voting 63 Yeas, 0 Nays, and 12 absent or 
not voting); Utah Senate Journal, 55th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess., Day 45 at 5-6 (5 
March 2003) (voting 27 yeas, 0 nays, and 2 absent). And the Legislature can 
~ amend the rules of procedure either by enacting new provisions or modifying 
existing provisions. 
3. The Legislature may define and regulate rights that it creates, 
subject to constitutional limitations. 
The opportunity to enter and withdraw a plea is a creature of statute. 
~ Therefore, the Legislature has the power to define the scope of the right to move 
to withdraw a guilty plea. As this Court noted in Merrill, the II right to seek 
withdrawal of a guilty plea is granted by statute" and therefore lacks "express 
constitutional protection." 2005 UT 34, ,I45; see also ,r,r25, 43 (repeatedly noting 
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that "right to withdraw a guilty plea" is not constitutionally protected). There 
"is no constitutional right to plea bargain; the prosecutor need not do so if he 
prefers to go to trial." Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977). 11 A 
criminal defendant does not have an absolute right under the Constitution to 
have his guilty plea accepted by the court ... although the States may by statute 
or otherwise confer such a right." North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 40 (1970); 
see also Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1410 (2012) ("[A] defendant has no right 
to be offered a plea ... nor a federal right that the judge accept it."). 
In Utah, the right to plea bargain, and to move to withdraw a guilty plea, 
is granted by statute. See Utah Code Ann. §§77-13-1 to -6 (West 2004 & West 
Supp. 2015); Merrill, 2005 UT 34, ,I45. Because the right to move to withdraw a 
guilty plea is a statutory one, the Legislature necessarily has the authority to 
define the scope of that right, including the time and basis for moving to 
withdraw a guilty plea and the proceeding in which the defendant must 
challenge the plea. As this Court has observed, 11 the Legislature's function" is 
"to create a litigant's legal rights, liabilities, and remedies consistent with the 
state and federal constitutions." State v. Alexander, 2012 UT 27, 141, 279 P.3d 
371; Cf. State v. Moreno, 2009 UT 19, ,rs, 203 P.3d 1000 (recognizing that 
Legislature can define juvenile court operation because juvenile courts II are 
created by statute"). 
-34-
Likewise, in the federal context, the United States Supreme Court has 
observed that "when Congress creates a statutory right, it clearly has the 
discretion, in defining that right, to ... provide that persons seeking to vindicate 
that right must do so before particularized tribunals created to perform the 
specialized adjudicative tasks related to that right." Northern Pipeline Const. Co. 
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 83 (1982); see also Davis v. Passman, 442 
U.S. 228, 241 (1979) (when Congress creates statutory rights and obligations, "it 
is entirely appropriate for Congress ... to determine in addition, who may 
enforce them and in what manner"). 
In sum, because the Legislature created the right to withdraw a guilty 
plea, it may define the deadline for doing so, provided that it does not deny 
constitutional rights. Defendant has not shown that it does. 
4. The right to appeal under article 1 §12, as originally 
understood and as properly interpreted today, does not 
require that a waiver of that right given as a result of 
ineffective assistance of counsel be subject to challenge in an 
appellate proceeding in which the defendant has the right to 
the effective assistance of counsel. 
Defendant argues that the PCRA is an inadequate remedy for defendants 
whose counsel are ineffective during their plea process because the PCRA does 
not provide such defendants with the right to the effective assistance of counsel 
to litigate their claims. Rep.Br.Aplt.26. But the law has never entitled a 
defendant to the effective assistance of counsel merely because he is alleging 
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that his trial counsel was ineffective. Rather, the right to the effective assistance 
of counsel depends on when, not whether, a defendant asserts a claim of 
counsel ineffectiveness. 
· Defendants are entitled to the effective assistance of new counsel to 
vindicate their right to the effective assistance of trial counsel only when they 
timely assert their trial-counsel ineffectiveness claim in a proceeding where the 
right to counsel attaches. 
a. Historical evidence suggests that the framers of the Utah 
Constitution did not contemplate that the right to appeal 
would include the right to the effective assistance of 
counsel in that appeal. 
The operative provisions of Utah Constitution article 1, §12 have 
remained unchanged since the Utah Constitution was ratified. They provide, 
"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend 
in person and by counsel ... and the right to appeal in all cases." Utah Const. 
art 1, §12. 
History provides little additional insight into the drafter's intent. A 1954 
historical analysis of Utah's right to counsel provision observed that "It is 
uncertain what obligations this provision imposes." Sanford H. Kadish & 
Edward L. Kimball, Legal Representation of the Indigent in Criminal Cases in Utah, 
4 Utah L. Rev. 198, 202 (1954). The authors did note, however, that it was 
unlikely that the provisions included the right to the assistance of counsel on 
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appeal. Id. at 203 ("Though the Utah Supreme Court has never passed on the 
questions, other courts have indicated that the right to the appointment of 
counsel does not extend to the appeal or to an application for a writ of habeas 
~ corpus."). 
It was not until 1963 that the United States Supreme Court held that an 
indigent defendant had a right to appointed counsel on direct appeal. See 
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). And it was not until 1985 that the 
United States Supreme Court confirmed that defendants possessed a right to 
the effective assistance of counsel in a direct appeal. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 
387,398 (1985). That the recognition of these rights under federal law is of such 
recent vintage strongly suggests that the drafters of the Utah Constitution did 
not contemplate that the right to appeal in article 1, §12 included the right to the 
effective assistance of counsel in challenging a conviction on direct appeal. 
b. As currently understood, the right to counsel under art. 1, 
§12 to pursue a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
depends on the type of proceeding in which that claim is 
raised, not on the nature of the claim. 
Whether a defendant has a right to the effective assistance of counsel 
depends on an express constitutional or statutory grant of that right, or on due 
process and equal protection principles. It does not depend on the nature of the 
right that the defendant seeks to vindicate. Nor does it depend on whether the 
assistance of counsel would be helpful to a defendant. See Ross v. Moffit, 417 
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U.S. 600, 616 (1974) ("[T]he fact that a particular service might be of benefit to 
an indigent defendant does not mean that the service is constitutionally 
required."). 
A defendant has a federal constitutional right to the assistance of counsel 
in his criminal trial, his first-tier appeal (if the state provides a right to appeal), 
and in certain probation or parole revocation proceedings. See Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963) (right to counsel at trial); Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963) (due process and equal protection require 
counsel in first appeal of right); Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 620-23 (2005) 
(due process and equal protection require counsel in discretionary first-tier 
appeal); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783-91 (1973) (due process may require 
appointment of counsel in probation or parole revocation hearing depending on 
nature of hearing). 
Likewise, the Utah Constitution grants "the accused ... the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel." Utah Const. art. I, §12. This 
Court has held that this section also entitles a defendant to counsel at some 
probation revocation hearings because his probationary status constitutes a 
limited liberty interest. See State v. Eichler, 483 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1971); State v. 
Byington, 936 P.2d 1112, 1116 n. (Utah App 1997) (recognizing that Eichler did 
not establish a "blanket right'' to counsel at all probation revocation hearings). 
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This Court has also held that a similar liberty interest entitles a defendant to 
counsel under both the federal and state constitutions when a district court 
grants post-conviction relief and the State appeals because the petitioner's 
Gi> liberty interest in his freedom has been restored. See Ford v. State, 2008 UT 66, 
,I,116-20, 199 P.3d 892. 
Defendant does not argue that he is entitled to the assistance of counsel 
under any of these provisions or holdings. He does not assert that he possesses 
any liberty interest analogous to that in Eichler or Ford. Nor does he identify 
any authority interpreting the right to counsel in article I, section 12 to apply to 
any challenge to a guilty plea regardless of when it is made or of the venue in 
which it is brought. 
On the contrary, as noted, this Court has already rejected Defendant's 
~ claim that he is entitled to counsel merely because he seeks to vindicate his 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of his trial counsel. This Court 
held in Merrill that "absence of a right to counsel to seek PCRA relief ... fails to 
jeopardize the constitutionality of section 77-13-6." 2005 UT 34, 'ff47. It also 
held that a defendant has no "right to maintain a perpetual grip on all 
procedural levers to withdraw a guilty plea." Id. ,I45. As mentioned, this Court 
also held in Rhinehart that" claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised in 
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the context of challenges to the lawfulness of guilty pleas are governed by 
section 77-13-6 as construed by Merrill." 2007 UT 61, if 14. 
Defendants have no right to the effective assistance of counsel in 
proceedings beyond those identified above. Thus, there is no constitutional 
right to counsel to collaterally attack a conviction, even though collateral 
proceedings usually involve claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness. See 
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) ("Our cases establish that the 
right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.") 
(internal citation omitted); see also Hutchings v. State, 2003 UT 52, ,120, 84 P.3d 
1150 ("[T]here is no statutory or constitutional right to counsel in a civil petition 
for post-conviction relief.") (citing Finley, 481 U.S. at 555-56). 
Although defendants are not entitled to counsel in post-conviction 
proceedings, the PCRA nevertheless allows for the appointment of pro bono 
counsel to assist indigent petitioners who raise complicated claims. The PCRA 
allows an indigent petitioner to request counsel when his petition may require 
an evidentiary hearing or when it "involves complicated issues of law or fact 
that require the assistance of counsel." Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-109 (West 2009); 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65CG). Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may meet 
those criteria. For example, this Court has observed that a motion to appoint 
counsel "would be well founded" in a PCRA proceeding that required an 
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evidentiary hearing to resolve a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See 
Ross v. State, 2012 UT 93, ,I,I59-60, 293 P.3d 345. If appointed, pro bono counsel 
would likely be able to file an amended petition refining the pro se claims and 
(i raising any additional claims. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(k) (allowing petition to 
be amended with leave of court). Thus, indigent post-conviction petitioners can 
be appointed counsel to assist them in challenging their trial counsel's 
effectiveness. 
In sum, apart from the context of a direct appeal, the Legislature may 
establish avenues for reviewing criminal convictions and vindicating 
constitutional rights without requiring the effective assistance of counsel. In 
establishing systems for reviewing criminal convictions, the Legislature may 
make reasoned distinctions among defendants. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 
612 (1974) (no right to counsel to seek discretionary appellate review) (citing 
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966)). That is precisely what the Plea 
Withdrawal Statute does. 
This Court therefore correctly held in Merrill that the Plea Withdrawal 
Statute could distinguish between defendants who timely file their motions to 
withdraw and those who do not. See 2005 UT 34, ,I41 (disagreeing "that a 
classification scheme in which persons are grouped according to whether they 
follow procedural rules is unconstitutionally arbitrary or unreasonable"). 
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Accordingly, Defendant has not shown that he has a constitutional right to 
counsel to challenge his trial counsel's performance, regardless of when or in 
wh&t proceeding he raises that challenge. 
c. Claims of counsel ineffe~tiveness associated with a guilty 
plea should not be treated differently than any other 
constitutional claim. 
The rule that there is no right to counsel to vindicate untimely claims of 
plea-counsel ineffective assistance puts Defendant's challenges to his pleas on 
the same footing as any other constitutional challenge. For example, when a 
defendant's appointed appellate counsel fails to recognize and argue a 
constitutional error that occurred at trial, the defendant's only remedy is under 
the PCRA. See State v. Rees, 2005 UT 69, if iJ18-19, 125 P.3d 874 (recognizing that 
claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must be raised under the 
PCRA and not in "an additional direct appeal"). Likewise, if the prosecution 
violates its duty to disclose exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 82, 87 (1963), and a defendant does not discover the violation before the 
deadline for filing a motion for new trial expires-ten days under rule 24(c) 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure-he can seek relief only under the PCRA.3 
So too for a defendant who discovers new evidence of actual innocence after the 
deadline for filing a motion for new trial. Because these claims must be raised 
3 A court may extend the ten-day deadline, but only if the request is 
made before the original deadline expires. See Utah R. Crim. P. 24(c). 
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in post-conviction review where there is no right to counsel, there is no right to 
press these claims with the effective assistance of counsel. 
This result is fully consistent with the Defendant's federal constitutional 
rights. As explained, a defendant has no federal constitutional right to counsel 
beyond his direct appeal, even to vindicate federal constitutional rights. See 
Finley, 481 U.S. at 555 ("Our cases establish that the right to appointed counsel 
extends to the first appeal of right, and no further."). 
In Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012), the Supreme Court 
confronted whether to extend the "right to effective counsel" to II collateral 
proceedings which provide the first occasion to raise a claim of ineffective 
assistance at trial." Recognizing its prior holdings establishing the 
11 constitutional rule" that "there is no right to counsel in collateral proceedings," 
the Court expressly declined to resolve whether an "exception" to that rule 
11 exists as a constitutional matter." Id. Instead, the Court held only that in 
federal habeas review, 11 [i]nadequate assistance" during a state collateral 
proceeding that presents a defendant his first opportunity to raise a claim of 
ineffective assistance at trial "may establish cause for a prisoner's procedural 
default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial." Id. 
In sum, because a defendant is not entitled to counsel merely because he 
asserts that his plea counsel was ineffective, the Legislature may properly 
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require him to use the PCRA to vindicate his constitutional right to effective 
counsel during the plea process. This Court has therefore correctly held that 
defendants who miss the Plea Withdrawal Statute's deadline can proceed only 
under the PCRA, even when challenging plea counsel's effectiveness. See 
Merrill, 2005 UT 34, if if 45, 47; Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, if 14. 
Defendant has not shown that this rule lacks weight or supporting 
authority. Consequently, he has not met Menzies' first two criteria for 
persuading this Court to overrule that precedent. See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 
393, 399-400 (Utah 1994). 
D. A jurisdictional time limit works well because it promotes good 
policy. 
The jurisdictional nature of the Plea Withdrawal Statute's deadline 
promotes good policy. The rule prevents the waste of prosecutorial and judicial 
resources by discouraging motions to withdraw a guilty plea based on "buyer's 
remorse" or other considerations not directly related to the validity of the plea. 
By requiring defendants to file a motion to withdraw a guilty plea before 
sentence is announced, the statute prevents defendants from previewing their 
sentence before deciding whether to seek to withdraw their guilty plea. The 
jurisdictional time limit thus assures that motions to withdraw are based on 
actual defects in the plea itself and not merely on dissatisfaction with the 
sentence or some other factor unrelated to the plea. 
-44-
The statute also gives weight to the significance of a guilty plea and 
protects the State's, the judiciary' s, and the victims' interest in the finality of 
judgments. As this Court recognized in Merrill, the statute's jurisdictional bar 
@ "is clearly intended to protect the State from difficulties associated with 
prosecuting stale claims and generally preserves the judiciary' s interest in the 
finality of judgments." 2005 UT 34, ,I44. 
Overruling the statute's jurisdictional deadline would be unworkable 
because it would produce the incongruous result that convictions based on 
guilty pleas would never be final, while convictions based on jury verdicts 
would be. But if any conviction should be final, it should be a conviction based 
on a guilty plea. 
The State's, the judiciary's, and the victims' interest in finality is strongest 
~ with a guilty plea. The unquestionable benefits of plea bargaining for II all 
concerned" are realized II only if dispositions by guilty plea are accorded a great 
measure of finality." Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977). A guilty plea 
should be an efficient and final resolution of a case. A II guilty plea reduces the 
scope of potentially appealable issues and ... may indicate that the defendant 
seeks an end to judicial proceedings." Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480 
(2000). It usually comes after the prosecution has made significant concessions 
to defendant in exchange for finality and resource preservation. It always 
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includes an admission of at least some level of culpability. Once a defendant 
enters a guilty plea, both the prosecution and the courts should be able to focus 
their resources on the next case, and especially those cases where a defendant is 
challenging his guilt and asserting his full panoply of constitutional rights. 
Crime victims should also be allowed to move on with their lives, assured that 
challenges to guilty pleas will be limited. 
Relegating untimely plea challenges to post-conviction review furthers 
these interests. The PCRA includes its own deadlines and procedural rules that 
promote finality, while still allowing defendants to raise constitutional 
challenges to their convictions. See Utah Code Ann. §§78B-9-106 & 78B-9-107 
(West 2009 & West Supp. 2015). 
In sum, the Plea Withdrawal Statute's deadline works well because it 
furthers good policy. Defendant therefore has not met Menzies' third criteria for 
persuading this Court to overrule its precedent. See 889 P.2d at 399-400. 
E. Def end ant's remaining arguments and authorities are 
unpersuasive. 
Defendant argues that in Rhinehart, this Court did not "directly" address 
whether the Plea Withdrawal Statute could bar the untimely assertion of a 
challenge to a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Rep.Br.Aplt.18-19,30. He also argues that this Court should reconsider 
Rhinehart in light of the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Padilla v. 
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Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012), and Missouri 
v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). Rep.Br.Aplt.20. Defendant is mistaken. 
Rhinehart did directly address whether to create an exception to the Plea 
~ Withdrawal Statute's jurisdictional bar based on an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim. 2007 UT 61 ,Jifll-12. Rhinehart argued that the Plea Withdrawal 
Statute II unconstitutionally deprive[ d] her of her right to appeal" because "the 
ineffectiveness of her trial counsel caused her to enter her plea and fail to bring 
a timely motion to withdraw it." Id. if 11. This Court II directly" rejected that 
claim and held II that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised in the 
context of challenges to the lawfulness of guilty pleas are governed by section 
77-13-6 as construed by Merrill and confirmed by Grimmett." Id. if14. 
Moreover, Defendant reads too much into Padilla, Lafler, and Frye. And he 
lacks standing to challenge the statute on the grounds that it prevents him from 
obtaining relief for ineffectiveness during the plea process that does not 
invalidate his plea. 
1. Padilla, Lafler, and Frye do not undermine the 
constitutionality of the statute's jurisdictional deadline. 
Padilla, Lafler, and Frye do not affect this Court's precedent holding that 
the statutory deadline is both jurisdictional and constitutional. Padilla 
addressed only whether the Sixth Amendment applied to counsel's advice 
about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea. Lafler and Frye addressed 
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only the appropriate remedy for counsel ineffectiveness that taints the plea 
bargaining process. None of those cases require the State to provide a 
particular procedure to address claims of counsel ineffectiveness during the 
plea process, let alone require the State to allow defendants to raise those claims 
in the criminal proceeding and on direct appeal. 
In Padilla, the defendant argued that his plea was invalid because his 
counsel incorrectly advised him about the deportation consequences of his plea. 
559 U.S. at 359. The Kentucky courts had denied his claim, holding that the 
Sixth Amendment did not apply to advice about deportation because such 
consequences were "collateral" rather than "direct" consequences of a guilty 
plea. Id. at 364-65. The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the direct versus 
collateral consequences distinction because of the "particularly severe" 
consequence of deportation. Id. at 365-75. It held that counsel's incorrect advice 
about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea could amount to ineffective 
assistance. Id. 
In Lafler and Frye, the Supreme Court considered the appropriate remedy 
for defendants who are denied a plea offer as a result of their counsel's 
ineffective assistance, and then receive a less favorable outcome either by going 
to trial or by accepting a subsequent plea offer. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1382-83, 
1389; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404. In Lafler, the Court held that any deficient 
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performance during the plea bargaining process could not be redressed by a 
subsequent fair trial. 132 S. Ct. at 1385-88. Rather, such a defendant can obtain 
relief for his counsel's ineffectiveness during the plea process if he can show a 
~ reasonable probability that the outcome of that process would have been 
different had he received competent advice. Id. at 1385. 
In Frye, the defendant accepted a less favorable plea offer after counsel's 
deficient performance caused a more favorable offer to lapse. 132 S. Ct. at 1404. 
The Court held that such defendants could obtain relief if they could 
11 demonstrate a reasonable probability they would have accepted the earlier 
plea offer had they been afforded effective assistance of counsel" and II a 
reasonable probability neither the prosecution nor the trial court would have 
prevented the offer from being accepted or implemented." Id. at 1410. In both 
Lafler and Frye, the Court based its holdings, in part, on its observation that the 
plea bargaining process plays a II central role" in the criminal justice system. 
~ Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407. But neither case changed 
anything for defendants-like Defendant here-who accept the most favorable 
plea terms they were offered. 
Padilla, Lafler, and Frye, all reiterated that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel extends to plea negotiations. Padilla, 599 U.S. at 364-66; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 
at 1384; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1405. But this established nothing new. The Supreme 
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Court had extended that right to the plea bargaining process twenty-seven 
years earlier in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985). 
Padilla, Lafler, and Frye therefore do not undermine this Court's precedent 
interpreting the Plea Withdrawal Statute, because those cases did not address 
the procedure, if any, that a state must provide to allow a defendant to 
challenge his guilty plea. In fact, all three cases involved collateral challenges to 
convictions - Padilla's and Frye's challenges arose in state post-conviction 
proceedings, Lafler's in a federal habeas petition. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359; 
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1405; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383. Those defendants were not 
constitutionally entitled to the effective assistance of counsel in those 
proceedings. See Finley, 481 U.S. at 555-56 ([T]he right to appointed counsel 
extends to the first appeal of right, and no further."). Thus, Padilla, Lafler and 
Frye do not undermine the constitutionality of the Plea Withdrawal Statute's 
jurisdictional deadline. 
2. Defendant lacks standing to challenge the Plea Withdrawal 
Statute on the ground that it does not allow for relief from all 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel involving the plea. 
Defendant argues that the Plea Withdrawal Statute is unconstitutional 
because it prevents defendants form obtaining relief from all instances of 
ineffective assistance during the plea process, including those that do not 
render a plea unknowing and involuntary. Rep.Br.Aplt.18-22. Citing Padilla, 
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Lafler, and Frye, Defendant argues that there may be instances in which a 
defendant receives ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea process, but 
that ineffectiveness does not render his plea unknowing and involuntary. 
@ Rep.Br.Aplt.19-20. For example, Defendant argues that under Frye, counsel is 
ineffective if he fails to communicate a plea offer to his client, and the client 
subsequently accepts a less-favorable offer. Rep.Br.Aplt.19-20 (citing Frye, 132 
S. Ct. at 1407-08). Defendant then observes that under the Plea Withdrawal 
Statute, a court may permit a defendant to withdraw his plea only if it was not 
knowingly and voluntarily entered. Rep.Br.Aplt.18. He then concludes that 
because a defendant may knowingly and voluntarily enter a guilty plea, even if 
he was unaware of a prior, more favorable plea offer that has lapsed, the statute 
improperly prevents him from obtaining relief for that particular instance of 
ineffective assistance. Rep.Br.Aplt.19-20. 
Defendant lacks standing to challenge the statute on this basis. 
;;;, Regardless, the statute does not bar relief in such a situation because relief 
would be available under the PCRA. 
Defendant lacks standing to claim that the statute unconstitutionally bars 
relief for counsel's ineffectiveness that does not render a guilty plea unknowing 
or involuntary. "[B]efore a party can challenge the constitutionality of a statute, 
he must be adversely affected by its operation." State v. Mahi, 901 P.2d 991, 
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1005 (Utah 1995). Defendant was not denied relief under the statute because a 
court found that his counsel's performance, while ineffective, did not render his 
guilty pleas unknowing and involuntary. Indeed, Defendant now claims that 
his pleas were unknowing and involuntary because of his counsel's 
ineffectiveness. Rep.Br.Aplt.31-42. Defendant therefore lacks standing to 
challenge the statute on this ground. See Mahi, 901 P.2d at 1005. 
But even if Defendant had standing to challenge the statute on this basis, 
and even if the statute actually imposes the limit Defendant identifies, the 
statute still does not prevent a defendant from obtaining relief for ineffective 
assistance that does not render a guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. Such 
a defendant could still obtain relief under the PCRA. As noted, the PCRA 
provides relief for any petitioner who "had ineffective assistance of counsel in 
violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution." Utah Code 
Ann. §78B-9-104(1)(d) (West Supp. 2015). Thus, the Plea Withdrawal Statute 
would not bar relief for such a claim. Rather, it would simply require the 
defendant to obtain that relief under the PCRA, rather than in his criminal case. 
In sum, Defendant has not carried his "substantial burden" of 
demonstrating that this Court should overrule its precedent interpreting the 
Plea Withdrawal Statute. See Menzies, 889 P.2d at 398. Under that precedent, 
this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the validity of Defendant's pleas 
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because he did not pursue a timely motion to withdraw them. See State v. Ott, 
2010 UT 1, 118, 247 P.3d 344. Because this Court lacks jurisdiction to review 
Defendant's pleas, it must dismiss the appeal. See Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 
~ 50, 18, 5 P.3d 649 ("Where an appeal is not properly taken, [an appellate] court 
lacks jurisdiction and ... must dismiss."). 
II. 
THE RECORD CONTRADICTS DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS THAT HIS 
COUNSEL WERE INEFFECTIVE DURING THE PLEA PROCESS; IN ANY 
EVENT, DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN PREJUDICE 
As mentioned, Defendant contends that this court should invalidate his 
guilty pleas because his counsel were ineffective during the plea process in 
various ways. Rep.Br.Aplt.31-42. Defendant claims that his original plea 
counsel 
• incorrectly explained accomplice liability; 
• did not provide him with full discovery; 
Q allowed him to plead guilty based on an inaccurate factual basis; 
o pressured him into pleading guilty; 
• forced him to accept the requirement that he testify against Martin Bond; 
and 
o told him to falsely represent to the trial court that he had no questions 
about his plea. 
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Rep.Br.Aplt.31-41. Defendant also contends that his substitute counsel was 
ineffective for advising him to abandon his motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
because he claims that the motion, if pursued, would have succeeded. 
Rep.Br.Aplt.41-42. 
As explained, this Court cannot consider these challenges to Defendant's 
pleas because it lacks jurisdiction to do so. See Merrill, 2005 UT 34, ilifl3-20; 
Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, iliJ10-14. Alternatively, Defendant cannot demonstrate 
that his counsel were ineffective because the record contradicts his allegations. 
Moreover, Defendant has not shown prejudice. 
A. The record contradicts Defendant's claims. 
To establish ineffective assistance, Defendant must satisfy the familiar 
two-part test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). He "has the 
difficult burden of showing [1] actual unreasonable representation and [2] 
actual prejudice." State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1259 (Utah 1993) (emphasis in 
original); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. "When challenging a guilty plea on 
the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, a [defendant] must demonstrate 
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors he ... would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted .on going to trial." Benvenuto v. State, 
2007 UT 53, if 25, 165 P.3d 1195 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) 
(omission in original). To show a reasonable probability that he would have 
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gone to trial, Defendant must show "that a decision to reject the plea bargain 
would have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 
U.S. 356,372 (2010) (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470,480,486 (2000)). 
Defendant also bears the burden of assuring that "the record is adequate" 
to review his ineffective-assistance claims. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 
if 16, 12 P.3d 92. "An appellate court will presume that any argument of 
ineffectiveness presented to it is supported by all the relevant evidence of which 
[the] defendant is aware." Id. at if 17. Thus, if "the record appears inadequate 
in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be 
construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively." Id. 
Apart from the pro se motion to withdraw his pleas that Defendant 
subsequently withdrew, no record evidence supports Defendant's claims that 
his counsel incorrectly explained accomplice liability, did not provide 
discovery, pressured him to accept the plea agreement despite its terms or its 
stated factual basis, or told him to lie to the trial court. Rather, the only record 
evidence about counsel's advice and actions during the plea process are 
Defendant's statements in his plea affidavit and colloquy. 
Those statements contradict Defendant's ineffective-assistance claims. 
When he entered his guilty pleas, Defendant declared that he understood the 
elements of the crimes to which he was pleading and that he was pleading to 
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aggravated murder because he "intentionally aided another person to 
intentionally or knowingly cause the death of another .... " R61;R410:11. He 
certified as correct the detailed factual basis stated in the plea affidavit and 
recited by the prosecutor. R60-59,57:R410:31-32. He also repeatedly denied that 
anyone had pressured or coerced him into pleading guilty, and he repeatedly 
certified that he was satisfied with his counsel's performance. He further 
confirmed that he had no questions that went unanswered. R57-56;R410:6-7,17-
18,28. His statements at the plea hearing were made under oath. R410:5. Thus, 
the only record evidence on these issues contradicts his claims. 
Nor has Defendant proffered any non-speculative evidence in his rule 
23B motion that would support his ineffective-assistance claims. His motion 
does include his own affidavit. But his sworn statements during the plea 
colloquy contradict the allegations in his rule 23B affidavit. The allegations in 
that affidavit are therefore inherently unreliable. See United States v. Lemaster, 
403 F.3d 216, 221-22 (4th Cir. 2005) (affirming summary dismissal of collateral 
attack on guilty plea where defendant's allegations merely contradicted his 
sworn statements during his plea colloquy). Defendant provides no evidence 
corroborating the statements in his rule 23B affidavit. Nor, as explained below, 
does he proffer a nonspeculative allegation of prejudice. 
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To the extent that his proffered evidence is sufficient to support his 
ineffectiveness claims, it is relevant only to determining whether a rule 23B 
remand is appropriate. See State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 290 (Utah App. 1998) 
(affidavits supporting rule 23B motions are considered "solely to determine the 
propriety of remanding ineffective assistance of counsel claims for evidentiary 
hearings"). Defendant's proffer accompanying his rule 23B motion is not part 
of the record on appeal and therefore cannot be a basis for holding that his 
counsel were deficient, or that he suffered any prejudice as a result. 
Thus, even if this Court had jurisdiction to consider Defendant's 
challenges to his guilty plea, this Court should reject those challenges because 
Defendant has not carried his burden to show, based on the appellate record, 
that his original counsel were deficient during the plea process. 
Nor has he shown that his substitute counsel was deficient for advising 
him to abandon his motion to withdraw his pleas. Defendant claims that his 
substitute counsel should have pursued the motion to withdraw because he had 
alleged meritorious claims of original counsel's ineffectiveness. Rep.Br.Aplt.41-
42. But again, the record contradicts those claims of deficient performance. 
Therefore, Defendant has not demonstrated that any of his plea counsel were 
deficient. 
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B. Defendant has not shown prejudice. 
Even if the record supported Defendant's deficient performance claims, 
he cannot show prejudice. Although Defendant alleges that, but for his 
counsel's performance, he would have rejected the plea offer and insisted on 
going to trial, Defendant has not demonstrated why that decision "would have 
been rational under the circumstances." Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372. 
Defendant had compelling reasons to accept the plea offer. And counsel 
had equally compelling reasons to advise him not to pursue a motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas, even if the motion would have been successful. 
The plea bargain provided Defendant significant benefits. It spared him 
the possibility of a death sentence and secured the State's recommendation that 
he be sentenced to twenty-five years to life with the possibility of parole and 
that his sentences run concurrently. R57. The State also agreed to dismiss two 
additional first-degree felonies. R57. Additionally, the State's case against 
Defendant was strong and based on the testimony of two eyewitnesses and 
Defendant's admissions to police. 
Had Defendant chosen to go to trial, or succeeded in withdrawing his 
pleas, he faced the substantial possibility of a much less favorable outcome, 
including a possible sentence of death or life without parole for aggravated 
murder. See Utah Code Ann. §76-3-206(1) (West 2015). He also risked 
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conviction on additional first degree felonies and the possibility of consecutive 
sentences. 
·Defendant never clearly explains why rejecting the plea and going to trial 
~ would have been a rational decision. The closest he comes to doing so is 
arguing that he would not have been found guilty as an accomplice to 
aggravated murder because a jury would not have found that he possessed the 
requisite mental state. Rep.Br.Aplt.32-34,40. But the record provides a strong 
basis to support Defendant's guilt as an accomplice to aggravated murder. 
I )I 
vi;, 
To be convicted as an accomplice, the State had to prove that Defendant 
encouraged or intentionally aided Bond, and that he did so with the mental 
state for the charged offenses. See Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202 (West 2004). For 
aggravated murder, Defendant either had to intend that Mortensen die or be 
~ reasonably certain that he would die. See Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202(1) (West 
2015). 
The evidence persuasively established that Defendant intentionally aided 
Bond to take Mortensen' s life and that Defendant did so with the requisite 
mental state. Although there was no direct evidence of Defendant's intent with 
respect to Mortensen's murder, the compelling evidence established both that 
Defendant intended to help Bond murder Mortensen, and intended or was 
reasonably certain that Mortensen would die. See State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, 
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,J48, 82 P.3d 1106 ("It is well established that criminal intent is seldom proved 
by direct evidence but must be instead inferred from the circumstances of the 
given facts."). 
After Mortensen showed Defendant and Bond where he kept his guns, 
they both led Mortensen upstairs to his bathroom and forced him to kneel over 
his bathtub with his back to them. Mortensen' s hands were bound with zip 
ties. Defendant was holding the only gun that he and Bond had brought with 
them. R60. 
Defendant saw Bond pull out a knife and return it to his pocket. He 
nevertheless continued to hold Mortensen at gunpoint while Bond left and 
returned with a ten- to twelve-inch-long knife. He continued to hold Mortensen 
at gunpoint while Bond slit Mortensen's throat and stabbed him in the base of 
his neck. Thereafter, Defendant continued to actively help Bond steal 
Mortensen's guns and ammunition, kidnap Roger and Pamela, and dispose of 
and conceal evidence. R60-59. 
Even if Defendant did not know that Bond planned to kill Mortensen 
when the two arrived at Mortensen's house, or even after they led Mortensen 
into the bathroom, Bond's intentions became clear in the bathroom. Defendant 
watched Rettig pull out one knife, then leave and return with a different, 
presumably larger, knife. This all occurred after a helpless Mortensen had 
-60-
showed them where he kept his guns, and while Mortensen was bound and 
kneeling over his bathtub. Defendant nevertheless continued to hold 
Mortensen at gunpoint and made no attempt to stop Bond even though he had 
~ the clear means to do so. The trial court said it best when it observed at 
sentencing that Defendant was "the most powerful person" in Mortensen' s 
home that night because he held the handgun, and chose to use that gun to 
"empower" Bond to commit murder. R41:28. 
Defendant does not demonstrate that he likely would have been 
acquitted of aggravated murder. Compelling evidence demonstrates otherwise. 
The plea bargain also provided Defendant significant benefits. Therefore, 
Defendant has not demonstrated that rejecting the plea bargain "would have 
been rational under the circumstances." Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372. Consequently, 
..;;) his ineffective assistance claims also fail for lack of prejudice. See id.; Benvenuto, 
2007 UT 53, if 25. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR IN FINDING THAT 
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA TO AGGRAVATED MURDER WAS BASED 
ON AN ADEQUATE FACTUAL BASIS 
Defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred in finding that an 
adequate factual basis supported his guilty plea to aggravated murder. 
Rep.Br.Aplt.42-47. He asserts that the factual basis did not establish that he 
intended for Mortensen to die or that he knew that Bond was going to kill 
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Mortensen, _because it states only that he "observed" Bond slit Mortensen's 
throat. Rep.Br.Aplt.46. He argues that, at best, the factual basis establishes that 
he merely witnessed an aggravated murder. Rep.Br.Aplt.46. 
As explained, this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider this 
challenge to Defendant's guilty plea. See Merrill, 2005 UT 34, ,r,r13-20; Rhinehart, 
2007 UT 61, ,r,rl0-14. The plain error doctrine only allows this Court to review 
an issue that is not properly preserved for appellate review. See State v. Reyes, 
2002 UT 13, 14, 40 P.3d 630. It does not allow a court "to reach an issue over 
which it has no jurisdiction." Id. 
Alternatively, Defendant has not shown plain error because the factual 
basis was more than sufficient to support his guilt as an accomplice to 
aggravated murder. To demonstrate plain error, Defendant must show: (1) 
"that there was an error, [2] that the error was obvious, and [3] that the error 
was prejudicial." State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, if 55, 326 P.3d 645. Defendant has 
not shown any error, let alone obvious, prejudicial error. 
A factual basis is sufficient to support a guilty plea when it includes 
"facts that would support the prosecution of a defendant at trial or facts that 
would suggest a defendant faces a substantial risk of conviction at trial." State 
v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 672 (Utah App. 1993) ( citing Willett v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 
860, 862 (Utah 1992)). As explained, the factual basis recited in Defendant's 
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plea affidavit and at his plea hearing amply supported his prosecution as an 
accomplice to aggravated murder and created a compelling risk of conviction 
on that charge. Defendant stated in his plea affidavit that he was pleading 
~ guilty to "intentionally aid[ing] another person to intentionally or knowingly 
cause the death of another .... " R61. The evidence showed that he held 
Mortensen at gunpoint while Bond drew one knife, then left and returned with 
a larger knife, and that he made no attempt to stop Bond even though he had 
the clear means to do so. Therefore, Defendant demonstrates no error in the 
acceptance of his guilty plea, let alone an obvious, prejudicial one. 
IV. 
IF DEFENDANT PREVAILS, THIS COURT SHOULD VACATE HIS PLEA 
SO THAT HE CAN STAND TRIAL ON THE ORIGINAL CHARGES; 
EVERY OTHER UNCHALLENGED GUILTY PLEA WOULD ALSO 
BECOME OPEN TO CHALLENGE 
If Defendant establishes that the Plea Withdrawal Statute is 
unconstitutional and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, then the 
~ appropriate procedural remedy is to vacate his plea so that the State can retry 
him on the original charges and possibly seek the death penalty or a sentence of 
life without parole. Martinez v. Smith, 602 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1979) (if a 
defendant successfully challenges his guilty plea, "fairness requires that the 
case should revert to its status on the original charge as it was before the 
agreement to enter his plea of guilty"). 
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Moreover, if the Plea Withdrawal Statute is unconstitutional, then there 
will be no jurisdictional deadline on motions to withdraw guilty pleas. Every 
guilty plea that has not already been challenged would then become open to 
challenge through a motion to withdraw filed in the criminal case. See State v. 
·Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 994-95 (Utah 1993) (allowing defendant to challenge guilty 
plea three years after sentencing because there was no time limit on a motion to 
withdraw when he entered plea); State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 
1987) (post-sentencing motion to withdraw was properly brought where statute 
in effect when Gibbons pled set "no time limit for filing a motion to withdraw 
the plea"). Thus, if this Court were to hold that the Plea Withdrawal Statute's 
jurisdictional deadline is unconstitutional, then all guilty pleas that have not 
previously been challenged would be open to challenge, even though those 
defendants have been sentenced. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss this appeal for lack 
of jurisdiction. 
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Addendum A 

UT AH CONST. art. I, §12. Rights of accused persons. 
· In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have ... the right to appeal in all 
cases. 
Utah Const. art. VIII, §3. Jurisdiction of Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United 
States. The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other 
matters to be exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue all writs and 
orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction or the 
complete determination of any cause. 
Utah Const. art. VIII, §4. Rulemaking power of Supreme Court -- Judges pro 
tempore -- Regulation of practice of law. 
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in 
the courts of the state and shall by rule 1nanage the appellate process. The 
Legislature may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the 
Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the Supreme 
Court by rule may authorize retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore 
to perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United 
States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. The Supreme Court 
by rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and 
the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice law. 
Utah Const. art. VIII, §5. Jurisdiction of district court and other courts - Right 
of appeal. 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as 
limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary 
writs. The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. 
The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided 
by statute. Except for 1natters filed originally with the Supreme Court, there 
shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a 
court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-13-6 (West Supp. 2013). Withdrawal of plea. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the 
court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
(b) A re.quest to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea held 
in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. Sentence 
may not be announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held in 
abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made within 30 days of 
pleading guilty or no contest. 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in 
Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-9-109 (West 2009). Appointment of pro bono counsel. 
(1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may, upon 
the request of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel ·on a pro bona basis to 
represent the petitioner in the post-conviction court or on post-conviction appeal. 
Counsel who represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal may not 
be appointed to represent the petitioner under this section. 
(2) In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court shall consider the 
following factors: 
(a) whether the petition or the appeal contains factual allegations that will 
require an evidentiary hearing; and 
(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that require 
the assistance of counsel for proper adjudication. 
(3) An allegation that counsel appointed under this section was ineffective 
cannot be the basis for relief in any subsequent post-conviction petition. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 288, 2008 General Session 
Addendum B 

i. ·; ·:-: . . .. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BENJAMIN DAVID RETTIG, 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA OR 
NO CONTEST AND CERTIFICATE OF 
COUNSEL 
Case No.101101668 
Judge Thomas Low 
I, Benjamin David Rettig, hereby aclmowledge and certify that I have been advised of 
and that I understand the following facts and rights: 
N otifica1.ion of Charies 
Crime & Statutory Provisions· 
Criminal Homicide, Aggravated Murder 
U.C.A. §76-5-202 
Aggravated Kidnaping 
U.C.A. §76-5-302 
Fl 
Fl 
1 
Degreel\1in/Max Punishment, 
Fine + 90% surcharge 
Maximum penalty is death, life without the 
possibility of parole or an indeterminate 
prison term of not less than 25 years which 
Maximum penalty is life without parole or 
~ Tt,.:f pr,e 
Df?~ e+3l @+ee;dl· 15 years to life. Fine 
ofn&,ooQ. ~(01 ~~ ~ 
·, L1 tebt 
0000€;2 
______________ Explanatory Note _____________ _ 
When properly filled out, the following Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea 
contains all the requirements of Rule 1 I(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. If the District 
Court chooses to rely on this statement for purposes of strict compliance with Rule 11, it must 
make the fact. known on the record by referring to the state1:nent on the record asldng defendant if 
he or she read, understood and acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the defendant 
cam1ot read or understand English, the Court should ascertain on the record that the statement 
has been read or translated to the defendant. Although this fonn is for a guilty or no contest plea, 
it may b.e adapted for Alford pleas. 
D Enhanceable Second Offense. (Only if checked.) 
I know that if I am convicted in the future of this same crime, the second conviction will 
be a [Class __ Misdemeanor or __ Degree Felony.] The maximum penalty for that crime is 
I hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of and that I understand the 
following facts and rights: · 
Elements of Offense 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Infonnation against me. I have read it, or had it 
read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am pleading 
guilty. 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty are: 
Count 1: Criminal Homicide., Aggravated Murder 
1) On or about November 16, 2009, in Utah County, Utah, I intentionally or lmm:vingly caused 
the death of another or intentionally aided another person to intentionally or knowingly cause the 
death of another and, 
2) the homicide was c01mnitted incident to an act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal 
episode during which the actor committed or attempted to commit aggravated robbery, robbery, 
aggravated burglary, burglary, aggravated kidnaping, or kidnaping; 
3) the homicide was committed for pecuniary gajn; 
4~hOJ:nj ci de was cornmi.tted-m-a+1-@£-p>©Gi-a-U-,4~~t~0H-s,c~,er-~t-i-e11all y 
dey~~dra~-. · .. ~-. ~,s~o~~y~~. 
~-,,4·B~-41~-eath ~ ~A T er m 
Count 2: Aggravated Kidnaping 
1) On or about November 16, 2009, in Utah County Utah, during the course of committing 
unlawful detention or kidnaping, I did: 
2) possess, use, or threaten to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Utah Code Section 76-1-
601; or 
3) act with intent: 
2 
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.l 
(a) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after connnission or attempted 
commission of a felony; 
(b) to hinder or delay the discovery of or reporting of a felony; 
(c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another. 
Admitted Facts 
I understand that by pleading guilty, I am admitting that I committed the foregoing 
crime(s). (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the foregoing 
crimes.) I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or contest) that the 
following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally 
liable. These facts provide a basis for the Comt to accept my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) and 
prove the elements of the c1ime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest): 
On or about Novem.ber 16, 2009, 1'1artin. Bond ("Bond") and I traveled in Bond's vehicle from 
Vernal, Utah to Kay Mortensen 's ("Mortensen.'') home in Spanish Fork, Utah.. The purpose in 
traveling to Morten.sen 's home was to steal firearms located in Mortensen 's home. Upon 
arriving at !,1ortensen. 's home, Bond indicated he would initially enter the !tome and then l 
was to follow him and also enter the home. Bond and I entered the home without being invited 
and we !tad a handgun witf-1. us. Bond placed zip ties on Morten.sen and both of us were 
wearing ski masks and latex gloves in order to hide our identities. We commanded l!,1ortensen 
to show us where his firearms were located. l!,f ortensen. took us to a bunker located behind his 
home and we observed several weapons. We took Mortensen. from the bun.leer and back in.to 
his home. After re-entering the h.0111.e, we took Mortensen upstairs to a bathroom. Bond told 
Mortensen to kneel down. in. front of the bathtub with !tis back to us. While 1J1ortensen was 
kneeling down, I was holding Mortensen at gunpoint with Bond's handgun. Bond withdrew a 
knife fro1n his person. and then placed the knife back in his pocket. At this point, Bond left the 
bath.room, went downstairs and returned with a black-handled knife approximately 10 to 12 
inch.es in length. Upon returning, I observed Bond take the knife and slice 1'1orten.sen 's throat.. 
I am 1i'ot certain how many tim.es Bond cut JJ1ortensen 's throat. After cutting his throat, I 
observed Bond stab A1ortensen in the base of his neck with the same knife. 
Shortly after Bond cut and stabbed Mortensen, we heard someone knock on the front door. I 
ran dmvn.stairs and hid behind the front door and Bond opened the door. A female and male 
were at the door asking for Mortensen. (I later discovered that the individuals were .Pamela 
antl Roger Mortensen.) I J.-vas still holding the handgun when Paniela and Roger entered the 
home. I in.formed Pamela and Roger that 111ortensen was upstairs and that he was okay. f,Ve 
told them to walk into the su;iken living room and we placed zip ties on Pamela's and Roger's 
hands and feet. At some point, Bond came out of the kitchen with another knife which I 
believed he was going to use to kill Pamela and Roger. I stepped in.front of Bond and told him 
not kill Pamela and Roger. While Pamela and Roger wei•e tied up in the living room, I 
remained in the living room with them holding the handgun while Bond removed 
approximately 25 of Mortensen 's weapons (including handguns and rifles) from the bunker 
and placed them in Bond's vehicle. FVe also took a11u1tunition from the bunker. After placing 
the guns and am.munition in Bond's vehicle, we took Roger's driver's license and told him and 
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Pamela that they needed to tell the police that three black men had tied them up and if they 
told the police a different stOIJ', we knew where they lived and we would come back and kill 
th.em. We left A1ortensen's residence and drove back to VemaL On our way back to Vernal, we 
stopped at a rest stop and discarded our gloves in a dumpster. In Vernal, Bond and I went up a 
canyon and buried the weapons. Following this, Bond took my /wodie and shoes in order to 
dispose of them. 
"'aiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering this/these plea(s) agreement voluntarily. I understand that I have the 
following rights under the constitutions of Utah and the United States. I also understand that if I 
, • • • I . \ I . 1 1 . 11 1 ,.. , , • • gl 
. p1eact gmlty \Or no contest1 w111 give up a ... tne rouowmg 11,,. 1ts: 
Counsel. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I ca1mot 
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the· court at no cost to me. I understand that I might 
later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's 
service to me. 
I liave not waived my right to counsel. 
I ce1iify I have read this statement and that I understand the nature and elements of the 
charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty. I also understand my rights in this case and the 
consequences of my guilty plea. · 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorneys are Michael Esplin, Stephen 
Frazier and Aim Boyle. My aiiomeys and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights and the 
consequences of my guilty plea. 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impa1tial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty. 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury 
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and b) 
my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to cross-
examine all of the witnesses in open court who testified against me. 
Right to compel ·,vitnesses. I lmow that if I were to have a jury tdal, I could call 
witnesses if I chose to and. I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiiing the attendance and 
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State 
would pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have 
a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also lmow that if I chose not to 
testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself I also know that 
if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify 
against me. 
4 
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Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty, I 
am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crime(s). If I choose 
to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty, 11 and niy case will be set for a trial. 
At a tiial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the charge(s) beyond a 
reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each 
juror \Jmuld have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty, I give up the presumption of innocence and will be 
admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I 
would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an 
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. By pleading guilty, I understand my light to 
appeal is limited. I understand that I am giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I plead 
guilty. I understand that if I wisi1 to appeal my sentence, I must file notice of appeal _within 30 
days after my sentence is entered. 
I kn.ow and understand that by pleading guil-ty, I am waiving and giving up all the 
statuto1y and co1tstitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of E11terin2 a Guiltv Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime 
to which I am pleading guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to a crime that canies a manrl.atory 
penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my 
sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both. 
I understand that if I am not a United States citizen, my plea(s) today may, or even will, 
subject me to deportation under the United States immigration laws and regulations, or otherwise 
adversely affect my innnigration status, which may include permanently baning my re-entry into 
the United States. I understand that if· I have questions about the effect of my plea on my 
immigration status, I should consult with an iimnigration attorney. 
I know that in addition to a fine, a ninety percent (90%) surcharge will be j_mposed 
together with a security fee of $33.00 for each offense to which I have plead guilty. I also know 
that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my c1imes, including any restitution 
that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as patt of a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another ( consecutively), or they may run at the 
same time ( concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I 
_plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another 
offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty, my guilty plea(s) now may 
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result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading 
guilty occun-ed when I was imprisoned or on parole, I lmow the law requires the court to impose 
consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences 
would be inappropriate. 
Plea Agreement. My guilty plea is the result of a plea bargain between myself and the 
· prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea bargain are fully 
contained in this plea agreement, including those explained below: 
In. exchange for my guilty pleas, the State of Utah agrees not to seek the death penalty 
in this case. In addition, the State of Utah will recomm.en.d to the Court that I receive a pe1ialty 
ofn.ot less than 25 years to life with the possibility of parole. The State of Utah. will also 
1·eco1nmend to the Court that the charges of Aggravated A1urder and Aggravated Kidnaping 
run con.currently with each other. _Fin.ally, if I receive a subpoena to testify against lt1artin. 
Bond, I agree to appear and testify truthfully. 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recormnen<lation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction.of the charges for 
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding 
on the judge. I also lmow that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the judge 
may do are not binding on the judge. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises 
except those contain~d in tltls plea agreement have been made to 111.e. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by an attorney, and I understand its 
contents and adopt each plea agreement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or 
delete anything contained in this plea agreement, but I do not wish to make any changes because 
all of the statements are conect. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am ;J J years of age. I have attended school through the _ &-~ grade. I can read 
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been 
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which 
would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the 
influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impainnent that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or 
from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enteiing my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty pleas(s), I can file a w1itten motion to 
withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I understand that for a plea in abeyance, a 
motion to withdraw fro~n the plea agreement must be made witltln 3 0 days of pleading guilty or 
no contest. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show that it ,,,a:s not knowingly and 
6 
voluntarily made. I understand that any challenge to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be 
pursued under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this ___ t _ day of ·'>uJ\l 
DEFENDANT ------
Certificate of Defense Attornev 
~ I ce1tify that I a..rn the attorney for Benjamin David Rettig, the defendant above, and that I 
know he/she has read the plea agreement or that I have read it to him/her; I have discussed it 
with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is 
mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate 
investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal 
~ conduct are con-ectly stated; and these, along \Vith the other representations and declara · ons 
made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and 
A TTORNEY!OR D&f'EN 
BarNo. OOL 
Certificate of Prosecutim! Attornev 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against Benjamin David 
Rettig, the defendant. I have reviewed this plea agreement and find that the factual basis of the 
defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is tme and correct. No improper 
inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea 
negotiations are fully contained in this plea agreement or as supplemented on the record before 
the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction of 
defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance of the 
plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
L__ ' --· l 'E ... ......... . .. 
DEPUTY UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Bar No. ~o c) ; 
ORDER 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing plea agreement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the 
signatures and finds tliat the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, knmvingly, 
7 00005(· 
and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the 
crime(s) set forth in the plea agreement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this ;;z_, day of ~ ,,;2Jo l ( . 
8 0000.SC 
Addendum C 

·..;; -
1 CASE NO. 101101668 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
DEPT. AMERICAN FORK - #2 • ........ - ., 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
----00000----
7 THE STATE OF UTAH, } 
} 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
8 Plaintiff, 
9 · vs. 
BENJAMIN DAVID RETTIG, 
Defendant. 
TRANSCRIPT 
OF 
ENTRY OF PLEA 
------------
BEFORE THE HONORABLE THOMAS LOW 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
THURSDAY, JUNE 2, 2011 
9:00 A.M. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 FILED 
18 APPEARANCES: 
19 For the Plaintiff: 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
For the Defendant: 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JAN 1~201% 
TIMOTHY TAYLOR, ESQ. -,AAll)A.AA~e 
JOHN NIELSEN, ESQ. NUU~,~d?"\;J 
MICHAEL ESPLIN, ESQ. 
STEPHEN FRAZIER, ESQ. .D. 
-. 
C':) ,-·- (J) ;;:: 
c~ j::! i~ t~ -ri 
i'-,) :·:: r-,·1 ::.i !~= 
__ _J •~··'J c:, ::~ rn 
25 Transcribed by: Mary Beth Cook, CSR, RPR 
J~p~~~ 
~- -~if 
Ul 
LAJ 
--.: 
MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR (435) 868-1075 
161 S. 200 W. Cedar City, UT 84720 
000' "i ~: 4.,.i, 
1 FOURTH DISTRICT COURT -AMERICAN FORK 1 
2 UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 2 
enters your plea today? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
3 THURSDAY, JUNE 2, 2011 3 9:00A.M. 
4 * * * 4 
THE COURT: We'll go through that in more detail in 
a moment. 
5 PROCEEDINGS 5 
6 * * * 6 
Is that the State's understanding of the agreement, 
Mr. Taylor? 
7 THE COURT: We'll call the case of State of Utah 7 MR. TAYLOR: Yes, it is, Judge. 
8 versus Benjamin Rettig. This is case 101101668. If counsel 8 
9 will please state their appearances for the record. 9 
THE COURT: Can I just ask you, Mr. Taylor, has the 
victim's family been consulted regarding this disposition? 
10 MR. ESPLIN: Mike Esplin for the defendant. 10 
11 MR. FRAZIER: Stephen Frazier (inaudible). 11 
12 THE COURT: And Mr. Rettig is here as well? 12 
13 MR. ESPLIN: Yes. 13 
MR. TAYLOR: Yes, Judge. The victim's widow is 
here, Darla Mortensen, and we have also some other extended 
family. We have talked with them. We have talked about this 
resolution, and they have been (inaudible). 
14 THE COURT: The State. 14 
15 MR. TAYLOR: Tim Taylor on behalf of the State. 15 
16 MR. NIELSEN: John Nielsen for the State. 16 
17 THE COURT: All right, thank you. The Court's been 17 
THE COURT: Do you know if any of them desire to 
speak today in regards -- not to any proposed sentence 
necessarily today but just in regards to the proposed plea 
agreement? All right, thank you. 
18 notified that the defendant intends to change his plea today; 18 
19 is that correct, Mr. Esplin? 19 
20 MR. ESPLIN: That's correct, Your Honor 20 
21 (inaudible). 21 
22 THE COURT: Would you like to proceed from the 22 
23 podium? 23 
Mr. Rettig, we're going to talk to you now for some 
moments here. If I could have the clerk administer an oath 
to you. Can we just free his right hand just for the 
administration of the oath? If you'd like, it could be 
resecured after the oath has been administered. 
Can you raise your right hand, please. 
24 MR. ESPLIN: Yes. 24 111 
25 THE COURT: Who is going to state the nature of th 25 111 
2 
1 agreement? Would you like to or would you like Mr. Taylor 1 Whereupon, 
2 to? 2 BENJAMIN RETTIG, 
<3 MR. ESPLIN: Sure, Your Honor. It's our 3 was administered the following oath by the court clerk. 
4 understanding that the State is going to file an Amended 4 THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the 
5 Information -- we've received a copy of that -- which will 5 testimony you give you're about to give in this case now 
6 result in the dismissal of Counts 3 and 4 to the Information 6 pending before the court will be the truth, the whole truth, 
7 and will allege Count 1, criminal homicide aggravated murder, 7 and nothing but the truth so help you God. 
8 and Count 2, aggravated kidnapping, both first-degree 8 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
4 
9 felonies, one a capital felony, one a first-degree felony. 9 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Rettig, just to make 
1 O In addition to that, the agreement would be stated 10 sure you're aware, the purpose of the hearing today is for 
11 with the plea statement which has been prepared in this case 11 you to enter a guilty plea -- or guilty pleas to two of the 
12 that the State would also recommend in return for the 12 State's four charges against you. In order to.do this, it's 
13 defendant's pleas of guilty to those two amended charges 13 necessary that I confirm that you understand everything 
14 would recommend that they would not seek the death penalty in 14 that's happening and all the consequences of your pleas 
15 this case and would recommend that the defendant receive a 15 today. If you do not understand something, please just let 
16 penalty of not less than 25 years to life with the 16 me know, and I will endeavor to make sure that you can 
17 possibility of parole. It also recommend that the charge of 17 understand it. If you ever need a delay or a chance to talk 
18 aggravated murder and aggravated kidnapping run concurrently 18 to your counsel at any time, you can do so there at the 
19 with each other. And that's the basis of the agreement. 19 podium or we can take a recess and you can talk in private. 
20 THE COURT: All right, thank you. 20 Can I just ask how old you are? 
21 Mr. Rettig, is that your understanding of the 21 THE DEFENDANT: I'm 23. 
22 agreement? 22 THE COURT: And how far did you go in school? 
23 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 23 THE DEFENDANT: Finished the 11th grade. 
24 THE COURT: And you understand the consequenc MR. ESPLIN: He does have a GED. 
25 your plea today if you do accept that offer and the Court 125 THE COURT: How long have you had that GED? 
NARY BETH COOK, cJR, RPR (435) 868-1075 S 
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1 THE DEFENDANT: Since the 11th grade. l 1 
2 THE COURT: And you can read and write the Engli ' 2 
3 language? 3 
4 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 4 
5 THE COURT: Have you taken any alcohol or drugs i 5 
6 the last 48 hours? 6 
7 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 7 
8 THE COURT: Any other medicine that could affect 8 
9 your ability to understand what you are doing today? 9 
10 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 10 
11 THE COURT: Do you currently have any mental, 11 
12 emotional or physical problems or issues that could interfere 12 
13 with your ability to understand what is happening here today? 13 
14 THE DEFENDANT: No. 14 
15 THE COURT: Has anyone forced, threatened or 15 
16 coerced you in any way into entering these pleas that are ·j 6 
17 proposed today? 17 
18 THE DEFENDANT: No. 18 
19 THE COURT: Has anyone made any promises to yo 10 
20 connection with your guilty pleas other than those that 20 
21 Mr. Esplin has already stated on the record? 21 
22 THE DEFENDANT: No. 22 
23 THE COURT: Are you, in fact, intending to enter 23 
24 these pleas of your own free will and choice? 24 
25 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 25 
6 
1 THE COURT: Have you had an opportunity to clearl 1 
2 discuss this plea agreement with your attorneys? 2 
3 THE DEFENDANT: I have. 3 
4 THE COURT: And you understand the terms of that 4 
5 agreement? 5 
6 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 6 
7 THE COURT: In Count 1 of the Information, you hav 7 
8 been charged -- and I understand even in the Amended 8 
9 Information you will be charged with aggravated murder which 9 
10 is classified as a noncapital first-degree felony under the 10 
11 laws of the state of Utah because a notice of intent to seek 11 
12 the death penalty has not yet been filed. The minimum 12 
13 penalty that applies to this offense is an indeterminate 13 
14 prison term of not less than 25 years and which may be for 14 
15 life and the maximum penalty is life in prison without 15 
16 parole. 16 
17 Do you understand that these are the possible 17 
18 penalties that attach to the offense of aggravated murder as 18 
19 currently charged against you? 19 
20 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 20 
21 THE COURT: Count 2 of the Information alleges tha 21 
22 you have committed the offense of aggravated kidnapping. I'm 22 
23 informed, and when we he hear the factual basis in a few 23 
24 moments, that that relates to Roger and Pamela -- I'm sorry. 24 
25 The one count addresses both; is that correct, Mr. Taylor? 25 
MR. TAYLOR: Judge, Count 1, the aggravated murder, 
obviously is Kay Mortensen. Count 2, the aggravated 
kidnapping, applies to Roger and Pamela Mortensen. 
THE COURT: So both Roger and Pamela Mortensen he 
been included in Count 2, I guess, and Count 3 which would 
relate to another one is being dismissed. That is also 
classified as a first-degree felony. The minimum penalty 
that attaches to this offense is presumed to be a prison term 
of not less than 15 years and which may be for life. 
However, if the Court finds that a lesser term is 
in the interest of justice and if I state the reasons for 
that finding on the record, then I could impose a term of 
imprisonment of not less than ten years and which may be for 
life and of not less than six years which may be for life. 
(Off-the-record bench conference.) 
THE COURT: Mr. Rettig, your counsel has requested 
a brief recess to look at the potential penalties for 
aggravated kidnapping. We'll do that and reconvene as soon 
as we're ready. 
{Whereupon, a recess was taken.) 
MR. ESPLIN: We believe that the Court is correct 
on that being the statute, and we have modified the statement 
of events to allege maximum penalty is life without parole or 
15 years to life. I've explained that to the defendant and 
I've explained that the Court can in this case (inaudible) 
8 
appropriate six or ten years. 
THE COURT: Thank you. And you've initialed that 
change on that document, Mr. Rettig? 
THE DEFENDANT: I have. 
THE COURT: Do you understand then the penalties 
for the offense of aggravated kidnapping? Should I go over 
those again, Mr. Esplin, or do you think that he --
MR. ESPLIN: I think he understands. Do you 
understand? 
THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
THE COURT: The presumption is 15 to life, but it 
could be higher, could be lower. 
I understand that the State has agreed to recommend 
a sentence of 25 years to life in exchange for your guilty 
plea to aggravated murder. It also agrees to recommend that 
the sentence on the aggravated kidnapping charge should run 
current with your sentence for aggravated murder. 
Finally, I understand that you agree that if you 
are subpoenaed to testify in a proceeding against Martin Bond 
that you would appear and testify truthfully in that 
proceeding. 
Is this your understanding of the plea agreement? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: In addition to those penalties we've 
discussed, you may also be ordered to pay a fine of up to 
MARY BETH COOKr clRr RPR (435) 868-1075 
161 South 200 West Cedar City, UT 84720 
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1 $10,000 for each offense. a 90 percent surcharge and a $33 
2 court security fee. I also may order you to pay restitution 
3 to the victims of your crime; do you understand that? 
4 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. sir. 
5 THE COURT: I want to go through the elements of 
6 the offenses with you now. The elements of the offense of 
7 aggravated murder as has been charged against you in the 
8 Information are as follows: That, first, on or about 
9 November 15th, 2009, in Utah County, Utah, you caused the 
10 death of Kay Mortensen and, second, that you did so 
11 intentionally or knowingly and, third, that the homicide was 
12 committed incident to an act, scheme. course of conduct or 
13 criminal episode during which you committed or attempted to 
14 commit aggravated robbery. robbery, aggravated burglary or 
15 burglary, aggravated kidnapping or kidnapping. Here I guess 
16 the applicable other offense would be aggravated kidnapping. 
17 The homicide -- it's also alleged that the homicide 
18 may have been or was committed for pecuniary gain --
19 pecuniary is just another word for monetary; that there was 
20 some sort of financial motive for it -- or that the homicide 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, cruel or 
exceptionally depraved manner. any of which must be 
demonstrated by physical torture. serious physical abuse or 
serious bodily injury to the victim before death. 
Do you understand that these are the elements of 
1 the offense of aggravated murder as it has been charged 
2 against you? 
10 
3 MR. ESPLIN: Your Honor, we would indicate that 
4 Mr. Rettig would be charged under the intentionally aiding 
5 another person to commit homicide. His involvement is as an 
6 accessory here. and he understands that as an accessory he is 
7 liable as if he were (inaudible). 
8 THE COURT: I didn't see a reference to 76-2-202 or 
9 the party liability statute in the statement. 
10 MR. ESPLIN: That's come -- that's in the factual 
11 statement. He was not the actual one that killed. Also. I 
12 don't know that Section 4 (inaudible) for the death penalty 
13 or capital homicide, but I think the State is really going 
14 under the No. 2 and No. 3 there. 
15 MR. TAYLOR: If it were to go to trial, we would 
16 try to use any one of those categories, but I think 
17 Mr. Esplin is right that that's kind of (ina·udible). I think 
18 our factual basis, you know. mostly adheres to 2 and 3. In 
19 our statement of defendant's plea under the element of the 
20 offense, we do include intentionally aiding another person, 
21 so either he did it or he intentionally aided another person, 
22 and so we did include that in our statement. 
23 THE COURT: In the facts? 
24 MR. TAYLOR: If you look on page 2. 
25 THE COURT: Under No. 1? 
1 MR. ESPLIN: It's there. 
2 THE COURT: And it's an alternate there? 
3 MR. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: As far as the admission in the 
5 agreement then today, are we agreeing that the defendant is 
6 only admitting to 2 and 3 or to the incident to attempt to 
7 commit aggravated kidnapping and pecuniary gain? Is that 
8 what the State is doing today? I thought the factual basis 
9 would support all three. and that's in the elements that you 
10 have provided to me, so I'm mentioning all three. 
11 Just for the record, Mr. Esplin, when you were 
12 referring to 2 and 31 you're referring to how they're 
13 numbered on the statement of events and not how they're 
14 numbered by statute. 
15 MR. ESPLIN: No, the statute (inaudible). 
16 MR. TAYLOR: Our argument is that it's not 
17 necessarily with regards to subs 2, 3 and 4 that he's 
18 admitting all of those because those are in 4. 
19 THE COURT: Right, and I understand --
20 MR. TAYLOR: So it would just be showing that he 
21 did it in conjunction with Mark Bond in this way or in this 
22 other way, and so that would be -- that's our argument. So 
23 we're not saying he necessarily did it. but that would be 
24 part of what we're proving so that he's not admitting the 
25 elements with regards (inaudible) 4. 
12 
1 THE COURT: I understand if you went to trial you'd 
2 want to have all three theories go to a jury, but this is an 
3 agreement, and so I anticipated -- and I guess I should have 
4 confirmed that earlier -- but I anticipated that there was an 
5 agreement to those three aggravating factors even though they 
6 are "or" under the statute. You only need one of them. 
7 MR. ESPLIN: It's probably academic except it 
8 concerns us about the sentencing situation although 
9 (inaudible) sentence (inaudible) affect (inaudible). 
10 THE COURT: It may. I want to make sure we have an (; 
11 agreement as to the element even though the statute is "or." 
12 By now we ought to have an agreement to the elements that 
13 we're pleading to. Do you need more time? 
14 MR. TAYLOR: Judge, I think that what we'll do is 
15 that we'd be fine with regards to the elements if Mr. Rettig 
16 admits to subparagraph 2 and 3 which show the elements 
17 (inaudible). 
18 THE COURT: Is that your agreement, Mr. Esplin? 
19 MR. ESPLIN: Yes. I think that's sufficient to 
20 support the plea. 
21 THE COURT: Any of the three are sufficient to 
22 support the plea. You have the original document in front of 
23 you. Mr. Esplin; is that right? 
24 MR. ESPLIN: They're going to file an Amended 
25 Information. 
MARY BETH cooK, c1k, RPR (435) 868-1075 
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1 THE COURT: I mean the statement of events. 1 intentionally and knowingly Mr. Mortensen•s death incident to 
2 MR. ESPLIN: Yes, I do, Your Honor. 2 those two aggravating factors; that those are the elements of 
3 THE COURT: If you could make a notation there 3 aggravated murder as it has been charged against you? 
4 then. 4 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
5 MR. ESPLIN: I'll just strike 4 then. 5 THE COURT: The elements of the offense of 
6 THE COURT: And if you could initial that and have 6 aggravated kidnapping as it has been charged against you in 
7 Mr. Rettig initial that and allow Mr. Taylor to initial that. 7 the Information are as follows: First, that on or about 
B l1m not sure, Mr. Taylor. if this level of minutiae 8 November 16, 2009, in Utah County, Utah, during the course of 
9 or details was discussed with the victim's family. 9 committing unlawful detention or kidnapping, you did either, 
10 MR. TAYLOR: It was not, Judge. We talked more 10 second, possess, use or threaten to use a dangerous weapon as 
11 generally with regards to the elements, not particularly with 11 defined in Utah Code Section 76-1-601 or, third, act with 
12 regards to going through every statutory (inaudible) as to 12 intent to facilitate the commission, attempted commission or 
13 what theory we would proceed. 13 flight after commission or attempted commission of a felony, 
14 THE COURT: Which enhancements would be used. n4 hinder or delay the discovery or reporting of a felony or, c, 
15 want to make sure since that's at least for me a change in 15 inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize a victim or another. 
16 what l1ve seen in the documents heie that them1s still no 16 Same question theie, Mi. Esplin. Is theie an 
17 desire on the part of the victims to make a statement today 17 agreement as to which of those aggravating factors or all of 
18 regarding the plea agreement. 18 them would apply? 
19 (Pause in proceedings.) 19 MR. ESPLIN: I think they would all apply, Your 
20 MR. TAYLOR: Just for the record I spoke with Darla 20 Honor. 
21 Mortensen and explained to her the amendment taking place on 21 
22 that. and we're ready to go forward and proceed. 22 
23 THE COURT: If I might just comment. I understand 23 
24 that in some ways this element is a difficult one even under 24 
THE COURT: It's your understanding then, 
Mr. Rettig, that you're admitting to all three of those 
aggravating factors today; is that right? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes 1 sir. 
25 these facts to establish because I don't know what evidence 25 THE COURT: Do you understand those elements of 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
14 16 
the State has regarding how long Mr. Mortensen lived. You aggravated kidnapping as I've explained that to you? 
need to also understand that it's probably the element with 2 THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
the most emotional impact and the most relevance to the 3 THE COURT: Regarding the assistance of your 
victim's family as it relates to suffering of someone who was 4 counsel now, l1m going to ask you first of all, I've asked 
dying. So I understand the difficulties today. I also 5 you before, but you have had a chance to discuss the entering 
understand the legal issues that the attorneys are involved 6 of your plea with your attorneys today? 
in, and it's a complicated one, and if you need more time, 7 THE DEFENDANT: I have. 
I'm happy to give it, but you•re ready to proceed? 8 THE COURT: And previously to today? 
MR. TAYLOR: We're ready to proceed, Judge. Tha k9 THE DEFENDANT: I have. 
10 you. 
11 THE COURT: All right, thank you. Let me just go 
through that one more time with you. 
10 THE COURT: You had an adequate opportunity to 
11 spend time with them so they could answer all of your 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
12 questions? 
Mr. Rettig, as far as the Court is concerned then, 13 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
the reason this is an aggravated murder is because the 
homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme, course of 
conduct or criminal episode during which you committed or 
attempted to commit aggravated kidnapping, and the homicide 
was committed for pecuniary gain. So instead of being "or" 
there, we're considering that you're admitting to both of 
14 THE COURT: Have your attorneys answered all of 
those aggravating factors; is that your understanding as 
15 your questions? 
16 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
17 THE COURT: Are you fully satisfied with the 
18 counsel and representation and advice that they've given to 
19 you in this case? 
20 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
well? 21 THE COURT: My understanding is that the attorneys 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 22 have been Stephen Frazier, Ann Boyle and Mike Esplin? 
THE COURT: Do you understand that these elemen 523 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
as we've gone through them this morning with the break that 24 THE COURT: Do you need any additional time to 
this happened on or about November 16, 2009; that you caused 25 confer with them? 
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1 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 1 with him and (inaudible) investigation prior to having plea 
2 THE COURT: Now, regarding the plea statement, 2 discussions. 
3 you've had a chance to read that plea document there in front 3 THE COURT: So you've uncovered additional evidence 
4 of you? 4 that he's been able to review? 
5 THE DEFENDANT: I have. 5 MR. ESPLIN: Yes. 
6 THE COURT: You've read it entirely paragraph by 6 THE COURT: All right. Do you believe, Mr. Esplin, Gv 
7 paragraph? 7 that there's a factual basis for these two pleas? 
8 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 8 MR. ESPLIN: I do. 
9 THE COURT: Did you have anyone read it to you, o 9 THE COURT: And do you believe, Mr. Esplin, that 
10 did you read it yourself? 10 your client understands the contents of the plea agreement 
11 MR. ESPLIN: Both. He read it himself. We left a 11 and the consequences of his pleas today as well as the 
12 copy, and he's had a copy for several weeks. 12 constitutional rights that would be waived? ~· 
13 THE DEFENDANT: I've read it multiple times. 13 MR. ESPLIN: Yes. 
14 MR. ESPLIN: We've also discussed it in detail with 14 THE COURT: Mr. Rettig, I'm still going to go over 
15 him (inaudible). 15 with you just one last time. This will be the last time that 
16 THE COURT: You've reviewed that document yours ~6 you will have those rights explained to you. You've read 
17 then when you've had it over the last couple of weeks the 17 them. You've had your attorneys explain them to you, and now 
18 elements of aggravated murder and the elements of aggravated 18 this will be the last one that will occur before your plea is GJ 
19 kidnapping as we've discussed them today? 19 entered. Please listen carefully to what I tell you and to 
20 THE DEFENDANT: I have. 20 my questions and be sure to let me know if there's anything 
21 THE COURT: You've also had a chance to review fo 21 that you do not understand. If you need to talk to your 
22 those last couple of weeks the possible penalties that would 22 attorney again, you may do so in private or there at the 
23 attach? 23 podium. 
24 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 24 You have the right to plead not guilty in this case G 
25 THE COURT: Have you been made aware of the 25 and to have the case tried through a speedy and public trial 
18 20 
1 evidence the State would present against you in this case if 1 before an impartial jury and an unbiased jury; do you 
2 it went to trial? 2 understand this right? 
3 THE DEFENDANT: I have. 3 MR. ESPLIN: One matter. We had a preliminary 
4 THE COURT: Based upon the evidence the State w ufd hearing, explained it to the defendant, and he has not waived 
5 introduce at trial, do you believe that there's a substantial 5 that as yet. We have explained that there's a preliminary 
6 chance that if the jury believed the State's evidence you 6 hearing set in this matter and that he has a right to 
7 would be found guilty of both aggravated murder and 7 preliminary hearing, and he needs to waive that before the 
8 aggravated kidnapping? 8 Court. 
9 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 9 THE COURT: We can do that first. Mr. Rettig, you 
1 O THE COURT: Have your attorneys reviewed with yo 10 do have the right to a preliminary hearing as well. One is 
11 the rights which are set forth in the plea statement, those 11 currently set for July in which the Court would make an 
12 constitutional rights to a trial? 12 independent determination based on the evidence provided by 
13 THE DEFENDANT: They have. 13 the State as to whether or not there is probable cause to 
14 THE COURT: Do you need any more time to talk to 14 warrant your continued prosecution on this case, in other 
15 them about those rights? 15 words, whether or not there's probable cause to warrant 
16 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 16 continuing towards trial. If you waive that right, then we 
17 THE COURT: 1111 ask you again. I'm sure you have, 17 will find that there is probable cause, which will be a very 
18 Mr. Esplin, but have you reviewed the evidence in this case 18 short finding because we will soon hereafter find that 
19 with Mr. Rettig? 19 there's beyond a reasonable doubt or that you have admitted 
20 MR. ESPLIN: Yes, on several occasions, Your Hono ,20 these offenses, but you'd also waive your right to a 
21 we have discussed the evidence and the implication of the 21 determination of probable cause by this court. Is it your 
22 evidence. 22 desire to waive that right to preliminary hearing in this 
23 THE COURT: So he's aware of your at least 23 case? 
24 interpretation of that evidence? 24 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
25 MR. ESPLIN: We've also had our investigator meet 25 THE COURT: And the State consents to that waiver? 
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1 MR. TAYLOR: Yes, sir, we do. 1 presumption of innocence and that you would have no 
2 MR. NIELSEN: Just prior to the Court's going over 2 obligation to prove your innocence because you are presumed 
3 this is we noticed one thing on the elements of aggravated 3 to be innocent; do you understand that right? 
4 kidnapping. The first one that the Court would note in the 4 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
5 course of committing unlawful detention or kidnapping that 5 THE COURT: Do you understand that if a trial were 
6 obviously should include the elements of kidnapping as well 6 held the State would have to prove each of the elements of 
7 since they were delineated in the statement. That's under 7 the offenses of aggravated murder and aggravated kidnapping 
8 76-5-301, An actor commits kidnapping if the actor 8 beyond a reasonable doubt before you could be found guilty of 
9 intentionally or knowingly, without authority of law, and 9 these offenses? 
10 against the will of the victim: (a} detains or restrains the 10 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
11 victim for any substantial period of time; (b) detains or 11 THE COURT: If a trial were held before a jury, the 
12 restrains the victim in circumstances exposing the victim to 12 verdict would have to be unanimous, meaning that each juror 
13 risk of bodily injury. We believe those would be the ones 13 would have to find you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
14 that apply in this case. 14 before you could be convicted; do you understand this? 
15 MR. ESPLIN: We have discussed those elements wi HS THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
16 the defendant as part of oui (lnaudib:e). 16 
17 THE COURT: Mr. Rettig, did you hear that 17 
18 delineation of the elements of kidnapping? 18 
19 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 19 
20 THE COURT: And you understand the elements wo l~0 
21 need to be proven against you on that count? 21 
22 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 22 
23 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Nielsen. 23 
24 Back to your right to a speedy and public jury 24 
25 trial before an impartial and unbiased jury, do you 25 
22 
1 understand that right? 1 
2 THE DEFENDANT: I do. 2 
3 THE COURT: Although you have the right to be trie 3 
4 by a jury, you may also have a judge decide your case instead 4 
5 of a jury if the prosecution and the judge agree to that. If 5 
6 a judge were to decide your case, the judge would also have 6 
7 to be an impartial and unbiased court or judge; do you 7 
8 understand that right as well? 8 
9 THE DEFENDANT: I do. 9 
10 THE COURT: You understand that if you have atria 10 
11 you have a right to be represented by an attorney throughout 11 
12 those proceedings, and if you cannot afford one, one would be 12 
13 appointed to represent you. You've been appointed the 13 
14 assistance of Mr. Esplin, Ms. Boyle and Mr. Frazier, and they 14 
15 continue to be your attorneys through today; is that correct? 15 
16 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 16 
17 THE COURT: If you do not plead guilty, you are 17 
18 presumed to be innocent until the State proves that you are 18 
19 guilty of aggravated murder and aggravated kidnapping. If 19 
20 you choose to fight or contest these charges against you, you 20 
21 need only plead not guilty and your case will go to trial; 21 
22 you understand that? 22 
23 THE DEFENDANT: I do. 23 
24 THE COURT: You understand that if a trial were 24 
25 held the State would have the burden of overcoming the 25 
THE COURT: Do you undeistand that by pleading 
guilty you give up the presumption of innocence, and you will 
be admitting to the crimes of aggravated murder and 
aggravated kidnapping? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: You have an absolute right to remain 
silent and you cannot be compelled to incriminate yourself 
or to provide evidence against yourself. An incriminating 
statement is a statement which would tend to connect you with 
the commission of the crimes. Do you understand that you 
have an absolute right to remain silent and that you cannot 
be made to incriminate yourself? 
THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
24 
THE COURT: In addition, if you choose to remain 
silent, your silence cannot be used against you at trial, and 
the jurors will be told that they could not hold your 
decision not to testify against you; do you understand this? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that a plea of guilty 
is an admission of all the facts which would be necessary to 
establish your guilt at trial? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Because a plea of guilty admits all 
facts necessary to establish guilt, it is an incriminating 
statement. Do you understand that by entering a plea of 
guilty you give up your right to remain silent? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Although you have a right to remain 
silent, if you were to have a trial you would have a right to 
testify in your own behalf if you wished to do so; do you 
understand that right? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: If you were to have a trial, you would 
have a right to confront and cross-examine any witnesses 
which may testify against you. This means that your 
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1 attorneys would be able to ask each witness questions while 
2 the witness is in open court and in your presence and under 
3 oath. Do you understand that you have this right? 
4 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
5 THE COURT: You also have a right to present 
6 evidence and to compel witnesses to appear in court to 
7 testify for you. This means that you would be entitled to 
8 obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of 
9 those witnesses, and that if you could not afford to pay for 
10 the witnesses to appear the State would pay those costs for 
11 you. Do you understand that you have this right? 
12 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
13 THE COURT: If a judge or a jury were to find you 
14 guilty, you would have a right to appeal your conviction to 
15 the Utah Supreme Court. In addition, you would have the 
16 right to have an attorney assist you in that appeal. If you 
17 could not afford the cost of the appeal, the State would then 
18 pay those costs for you. However, when you enter a plea of 
19 guilty, you admit your own guilt. Having admitted your guilt 
20 in this court, you cannot contest your own statement of guilt 
21 on appeal; do you understand this? 
22 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
23 THE COURT: Finally, do you understand that by 
24 entering a plea of guilty you give up all of the rights which 
25 we have just discussed as well as the rights set forth in the 
26 
1 plea statement? 
2 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
3 THE COURT: I'll now discuss briefly with you the 
4 consequences of entering a guilty plea. Do you understand 
5 that by pleading guilty to aggravated murder and aggravated 
6 kidnapping you will be subjecting yourself to serving 
7 mandatory penalties for these crimes? 
8 THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT: Your sentence will include a prison 
term and may also include a fine; do you understand this? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: In addition to the fine, a 90 percent 
surcharge may be or will be imposed, and you may also be 
ordered to make restitution for your crime; do you understand 
that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Because you'll be pleading to two 
offenses, the sentences that will be imposed for each crime 
may run concurrently or consecutively, that is, one after the 
other, and concurrently is at the same time or 
simultaneously. It is within the Court's discretion to 
decide whether ies a concurrent or consecutive sentence 
regardless of any plea agreement that you have entered into 
with the State; do you understand this? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
1 THE COURT: Are you on probation or parole at this 
2 time? 
3 THE DEFENDANT: No, I'm not. 
4 THE COURT: And the crime was not committed while 
5 you were on probation or parole? 
6 THE DEFENDANT: (No audible response.) 
7 THE COURT: I will now go over briefly with you the 
8 right to request a withdrawal of your guilty pleas. 
9 Ordinarily after a person pleads guilty but later desires to 
10 withdraw his guilty plea, he must file a written motion to 
11 withdraw the plea before sentence is announced. A guilty 
12 plea may only be withdrawn with permission from the Court and 
13 only then by a showing that the plea was not knowingly and 
14 voluntarily made, in other words, such a motion may be 
15 denied. Do you understand this? 
-ta TUC: nC:C:C:l\lnJ\t..lT• v,...,. ,.;,. 
IV IIILI.IL.ILl'll.lf"°\1111, lv.;J 1 ~11, 
17 THE COURT: Up to this point, Mr. Rettig, is there 
18 anything that you do not understand about this proceeding or 
19 about the pleas that you will be entering in this case? 
20 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
21 THE COURT: Is there anything that you would like 
22 to ask me or your attorneys before I accept your plea to 
23 aggravated murder? 
24 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
25 THE COURT: I'm going to ask the prosecutor to tell 
1 you and me what happened in this case. I understand that 
2 that is already documented on the statement in front of you, 
3 and you've had a chance to review that and read that, but 
4 I'll ask him to state that for the court record. I want you 
5 to listen carefully because when the prosecutor is through 
6 I'm going to ask you if everything that he said is true. If 
7 there's anything the prosecutor says that you believe is not 
8 true or accurate, I will want you to tell me about that, 
9 okay? 
10 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
11 THE COURT: Mr. Taylor. 
28 
12 MR. TAYLOR: Judge, on or about November 15th, 
13 2009, Martin Bond and Benjamin Rettig traveled in Bond's 
14 vehicle from Vernal, Utah, to Kay Mortensen's home in Spanish 
15 Fork, Utah. The purpose in traveling to Mortensen's home was 
16 to steal firearms located in Mortensen's home. Upon arriving 
17 at Mortensen's home, Bond indicated he would initially enter 
18 the home and then Rettig was to follow him and also enter the 
19 home. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Bond and Rettig entered the home without being 
invited and had a handgun with them. Bond placed zip ties on 
Mortensen, and both of them were wearing ski masks and latex 
gloves in order to hide their identities. They commanded 
Mortensen to show them where his firearms were located. 
Mortensen took them to a bunker located behind his home, and 
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1 they observed several weapons. They took Mortensen from the 
2 bunker and back into his home. 
1 said a true and accurate description of what occurred in this 
2 case? 
3 After reentering the home, they took Mortensen 
4 upstairs to a bathroom. Bond told Mortensen to kneel down in 
5 front of the bathtub with his back to them. While Mortensen 
6 was kneeling down, Rettig was holding Mortensen at gunpoint 
7 with Bond's handgun. Bond withdrew a knife from his person 
8 and placed the knife back into his pocket. At this point 
9 Bond left the bathroom, went downstairs and returned with a 
1 O black a.handled knife approximately 10 to 12 inches in length. 
11 Upon returning, Rettig observed Bond take the knife 
12 and slice Mortensen's throat. It is not certain how many 
13 times Bond cut Mortensen's throat. After cutting his throat, 
14 he observed Bond stab Mortensen in the base of his neck with 
15 the same knife. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 Shortly after Bond cut and stabbed Mortensen, they 16 
17 heard someone knock on the front door. Rettig ran 17 
18 downstairs, hid behind the front door and Bond opened the 18 
19 door. A female and male were at the door asking for 19 
20 Mortensen. They later discovered these individuals were 20 
21 Pamela and Roger Mortensen. Rettig was still holding the gun 21 
22 when Pamela and Roger entered the home. They informed Pa t2:a 
23 and Roger that Mortensen was upstairs -- excuse me. Rettig 23 
24 informed Pamela and Roger that Mortensen was upstairs and 24 
25 that he was okay. They told Pam and Roger to walk into the 25 
30 
1 sunken living room, and they placed zip ties on Pamela and 1 
2 Roger•s hands and feet. 2 
3 At some point Bond came out of the kitchen with 3 
4 another knife which Rettig believed he was going to use to 4 
5 kill Pamela and Roger. Rettig stepped in front of Bond and 5 
6 told him not to kill them. While Pamela and Roger were tied 6 
7 up in the living room, Rettig remained in the living room 7 
8 with them holding the handgun while Bond removed 8 
9 approximately 25 of Mortensen•s weapons, including handguns 9 
10 and rifles, from the bunker and placed them in Bond's 10 
11 vehicle. They also -- Rettig also helped take some 11 
12 ammunition from the bunker and place it in Bond1s vehicle. 12 
13 After they placed the guns and ammunition in Bond's 13 
14 vehicle, they took Roger Mortensen's driver's license and 14 
15 told him and Pam that they needed to tell the police that 15 
16 three black men had tied them up, and if they told the police 16 
17 a different story they knew where they lived, and they would 17 
18 come back and kill them. 18 
19 They left Mortensen•s residence, drove back to 19 
20 Vernal. On the way back to Vernal, they stopped at a rest 20 
21 stop and discarded some gloves in a dumpster. In Vernal Bond 21 
22 and Rettig went up the canyon and buried the weapons. 22 
23 Following this, Bond took the hoodie and shoes from Rettig in 23 
24 order to dispose of them. 24 
25 THE COURT: Mr. Rettig, is what the prosecutor just 25 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. sir. 
THE COURT: You have already signed that document, 
the statement of events? 
MR. ESPLIN: He has, Your Honor. For the record 
let me ask, is that your signature? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
MR. ESPLIN: May I approach, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes. thank you. I heard your attorney 
ask you this, and I have a document in front of me. On 
page 7 dated June 1st. which is yesterday, 2011. there's a 
signature above the inscription defendant, looks like a Ben 
Rettig. Is that your signature there? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Mr. Rettig, do you feel that it is in 
your best interest to enter a guilty plea in this case on 
these two counts rather than go to trial? 
THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
THE COURT: You have previously entered pleas of 
not guilty -- a plea of not guilty to the offense of 
aggravated murder and a plea of not guilty to the offense of 
aggravated kidnapping. I'm sorry, you have not. What plea 
do you now enter to Count 1 of the Information criminal 
homicide, aggravated murder, a noncapital first-degree 
felony? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
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THE COURT: I'll go count by count. Based on 
Mr. Rettig 1s answers to the questions posed to him, the Court 
finds that he has read. signed and fully understands the 
contents of the plea statement. Based upon the plea 
statement and the Court's discussions with and observations 
of Mr. Rettig, the Court finds that he has entered a plea of 
guilty to aggravated murder knowingly and voluntarily and 
with full knowledge of his rights. The Court also finds that 
Mr. Rettig understands the nature and elements of the offense 
of aggravated murder and the relationship between the facts 
in this case and the elements of that offense. 
Finally. the Court finds that the State•s proffered 
evidence, if believed. is sufficient to form a factual basis 
for Mr. Rettig1s plea of guilty. Based upon the foregoing, 
the Court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty to 
aggravated murder. 
Mr. Rettig, what plea do you now enter to Count 2 
of the Information, aggravated kidnapping which relates to 
Roger and Pamela Mortensen, a first-degree felony? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
THE COURT: Based upon Mr. Rettig's answers to the 
questions posed to him, the plea statement and the Court's 
discussions with and observations of Mr. Rettig, the Court 
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1 finds that he fully understands the contents of the plea 
2 statement and that he has entered his plea of guilty to 
3 aggravated kidnapping knowingly and voluntarily and with full 
4 knowledge of his rights. The Court also finds that 
5 Mr. Rettig understands the nature and elements of the offense 
6 of aggravated kidnapping and the relationship between the 
7 facts in this case and the elements of that offense. 
8 Finally, the Court finds that the State's proffered 
9 evidence, if believed, is sufficient to form a factual basis 
10 for Mr. Rettig's plea of guilty. Based upon the foregoing, 
11 the Court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty to 
12 aggravated kidnapping. 
13 Does the State have a motion regarding Counts 3 an 
1 THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
2 THE COURT: Is there anything else that I have 
3 omitted or need to handle today, Mr. Esplin? 
4 MR. ESPLIN: No, Your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Anything else I need to do today, 
6 Mr. Taylor? 
7 MR. TAYLOR: No, Judge. Thank you. 
8 THE COURT: I'd like to thank the attorneys for 
9 their hard work in this case. I know this is just the tip of 
10 the iceberg what we've seen and done here today and that many 
11 hours have been spent previous to this. It's a weighty case 
12 for all involved. It's a weighty case for the victims and a 
13 weighty case for you as well, Mr. Rettig. Thank you, 
14 4? 
15 
14 Mr. Esplin and Mr. Frazier and, thank you, Mr. Taylor and 
MR. TAYLOR: State moves to dismiss those counts, 15 Mr. Nielsen. We'll be in recess. 
16 Judge. 16 (Whereupon, the proceedings concluded at 
9:52 a.m.) 17 THE COURT: There's no objection I assume to that, 17 
18 Mr. Esplin? 18 
19 MR. ESPLIN: Yes. We have agreed that the State 19 
20 will provide an Amended Information. 20 
21 MR. TAYLOR: We'll file an Amended Information 21 
22 (inaudible). 22 
23 THE COURT: The Court will dismiss Counts 3 and 4 23 
24 on the motion of the State and anticipate the filing of an 24 
25 Amended Information in this case. 25 
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1 Mr. Rettig, pursuant to Rule 22 of the Utah Rules 
2 of Criminal Procedure, the Court must set a time for 
3 sentencing which cannot be less than two days nor more than 
4 45 days after the entry of the pleas unless the Court, with 
5 your concurrence, orders otherwise. 
6 What is the party's request? 
7 MR. ESPLIN: We'd request the matter be set I 
8 believe it's on the 19th of July, Your Honor, which is 
9 actually two days, I think, past the 45 days. The defendant 
10 will waive the time (inaudible) two days. 
11 THE COURT: Is that your desire, Mr. Rettig, to 
12 waive your right to be sentenced in less than 45 days? 
13 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
14 THE COURT: We'll set sentencing then in this case 
15 for July 19th at 2:30 p.m. 
16 Mr. Rettig, an agent from Adult Probation and 
17 Parole will be contacting you at the jail and interviewing 
18 you and providing you with paperwork to fill out regarding 
19 your life and your experiences and your criminal history and 
20 other items. We'll order that you cooperate with him in 
21 preparation of that presentence report. He'll also be 
22 compiling information from the State and from the defense and 
23 from the victims in this case to provide a complete sentence 
24 to the Court for sentencing on July 19th. 
25 Do you have any questions about that process? 
1 
2 
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UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK, UTAH; DECEMBER 13, 2011 
JUDGE THOMAS LOW 
(Transcriber's note: speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: We'll call Mr. Rettig's case. This is 
No. 101101668. 
Good afternoon Mr. Rettig, how are you? 
MR. RETTIG: Good. How are you, Judge? 
THE COURT: Good, thank you. 
Mr. Facemyer, okay if I read this right now? 
MR. FACEMYER: Yeah, it's just that - it's one page 
and then a little bit on the second, Your Honor. 
If I might begin with the statutory provision, if 
that's okay with the Court, my client -
THE COURT: FirRt of all, have you had a chance to 
read the PSI? 
MR. FACEMYER: That's what I was going to refer to, 
Your Honor. My client, pursuant to statute, Your Honor, has 
read the presentence report, he understands it. There is no 
desire for corrections or changes to be made there. 
Your Honor, we do have - I do have one item I would 
like - two items I'd like to address as it relates to the 
presentence report, Your Honor, if I might. 
THE COURT: Speaking to the recommendation now? 
1 
····- .. -··-··-·--------··••---------··----··· ···••·------·•--· 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. FACEMYER: Correct. 
THE COURT: All right, go ahead. 
MR. FACEMYER: Well, actually two things first, 
before I speak to the recommendation. At our last hearing, 
Your Honor, we had talked about providing the admitted facts 
and the presentence statement to be part of the presentence 
report. I've made a copy for the Court and I was wondering 
if we might be able to do that right now? 
THE COURT: That would be fine. 
MR. FACEMYER: The prosecution and I addressed that 
at our last hearing. G:J 
THE COURT: All right, we'll incorporate that and 
make sure it accompanies the PSI. 
MR. FACEMYER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Additionally, Your Honor, if we could just turn to 
Page - well, Aggravating and Mi t,j gat. i ng Ci rc:umstances form. 
I informed the Court at our last hearing that this would be 
one issue that I, or the only issue legally that I would ask 
for a ruling on the court from as it relates to this and it's 
in relation to mitigating circumstances, Your Honor. 
In mitigating circumstances where are 15 mitigation 
lines items that can be provided for. In my report, Your 
Honor, it shows No. 4 is a mitigating and No. 12 they 
indicate is a mitigating. 
I would ask the Court to also make a ruling today 
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on Nos. 4, 8 and 11. Just briefly, Your Honor, I would just 
argue that No. 4 is based upon, based upon my client's age, 
he's 24 now. 
Is that correct? 
He's 24, turned 24 on September 9. I think that is 
what I would classify as young, as it relates to this case 
and I'd ask that that be a mitigating circumstance. 
No. 8, Your Honor, he has exceptionally good 
employment and/or family relationships. I think the 
attachments to the presentence report establishes in and of 
itself of his family relationships. I'm sure th_e Court read 
those letters from family and their support for him and also 
he's been employed up until the time of this incident and 
being incarcerated. 
No. 11, Your Honor, offender was less active 
participant in the crime. I think :it's estnhlished Your 
Honor by our admitted facts that my client's statement in 
this case and also the admitted statements by prosecution and 
the defendant are that the defendant was present at the time 
of the actual homicide but did not participate in the actual 
act. And so I would just ask for a ruling on 4, 8 and 11. 
Those are my arguments based upon those issues, Your Honor. 
Do you have any questions for me as it relates to 
those? 
THE COURT: Is this a stipulation or is there 
---------·-····-·-·-- - . - ······ 
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argument on this issue? 
MR. FACEMYER: No, I don't think it's a 
stipulation, Your Honor. It's just I've informed my client 
that these are the things that I think would be, what I would 
request and I recognize, Your Honor, that this is not a 
supervision case. I recognize that but I also recognize this 
report will go forward with him for the next many years and 
so I'm trying to make sure that all the opportunities of 
mitigating experience would be of opportune for him if it 
were presented. 
THE COURT: Do you mind if I just ask then, I don't 
really remember from looking through this if the employment 
record that he had, that stellar of an employment of a 
record? ~ 
MR. FACEMYER: Your Honor, in the presentence 
report. it says that he has not moved forward in education or 
career and my client would admit that he had not moved 
forward in education or a career opportunity but he did have 
a good working job at the time of the offense and he was 
continuously employed. He wouldn't say that this was his 
career in life as far as employment, but that he was steadily 
employed from 18 on, pretty much, Your Honor, keeping busy 
with employment. 
In the actual area, Your Honor, it says, "He has no 
income due to incarceration but having worked at Zimmerman 
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Equipment in Vernal at the time of arrest." And he had jobs 
before that as well, Your Honor. Yeah, he's always been 
employed. 
And I would indicate, Your Honor, it says and/or as 
well and I think one chief factor and I don't really want to 
take a lot of time on this issue, Your Honor, but one key 
factor is the family has repeatedly stated in their 
statements, Your Honor, that upon his release he will have a 
home where he will have a safe environment and will be able 
to be productive, positive on parole and those letters we 
don't always get, Your Honor, parents who look at future 
opportunities coming and making sure that this individual has 
a good support staff upon a release and so that's one of the 
factors that I was taking into consideration as it relates to 
that. 
THE COURT: So you're focusing more on the family 
relationships? 
MR. FACEMYER: I am. And we do openly recognize a 
career was not where he was but he was continually and 
constantly employed. 
THE COURT: Anything from the State on those three 
issues? 
MR. TAYLOR: Yes, Judge. With regards to Item No. 
4 that the offender is young, I'm not going to argue against 
that. Usually I see that more in support of an 18, 19-year 
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old but 24, they don't give us any guidance as to what they 
mean by young. 
The second one is good employment or family 
relationships. His family has been here, so I don't know - I 
know· a little bit about his employment and so I'm not really 
opposed to that one. 
However, this last one, No. 11, offender was less 
active participant in the crime. Judge, our investigation 
and what he's admitted to in regards to the facts, the only 
difference between him and Mr. Bond is Mr. Bond is the one 
who actually cut Kay Mortensen's throat. Mr. Rettig held the 
gun while Mr. Mortensen was kneeling over the bathtub zip 
tied. Mr. Bond left the bathroom, went downstairs, grabbed a 
kitchen knife and came back upstairs while Mr. Bond was -
while Mr. Rettig was sitting there holding a gun on him. So 
less act.ivP. pr.1rti.cipant with regards to - there's only person 
who actually cut his throat, but, everything before, during 
and after, Mr. Rettig was right there at all times and so we 
would strenuously oppose that you recognize that as a 
mitigating factor. 
MR. FACEMEYER: I'll submit it. 
THE COURT: All right. Based on the agreement, 
I'll find No. 4, that the defender is young as a mitigating 
circumstance. I'll find No. 8, that the offender has an 
exceptionally good family relationship support. I will note 
··•··•······--· ..... -~-----
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now since I'm discussing it that I have read those letters. 
I'm very impressed with those letters. A lot of people took 
a lot of time to write on his behalf. I am impressed with 
his past relationships and connections to family. 
I agree with the State on No. 11 and will deny that 
request. 
MR. FACEMYER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
May I speak to the report as in general? 
THE COURT: Go ahead, thank you. 
MR. FACEMYER: Thank you, Your Honor. In this 
matter, Judge, we would just like to ensure that the letter 
here that Mr. Rettig has provided is a part of the record as 
well. 
THE COURT: All right, we'll incorporate that. 
MR. FACEMYER: He did want to make a short 
statement. Would the Court want that to be after me or at 
the conclusion? 
THE COURT: Usually at the conclusion. 
MR. FACEMYER: Okay. Your Honor, in this matter, 
the defendant has a recommendation for the Utah State Prison 
for an indeterminate time of not less than 25 years but which 
may be for life, restitution amount. This is a mandatory 
sentence based upon the charges that the defendant pled to, 
Your Honor. 
I'd indicate to the Court that I've had opportunity 
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to discuss in detail not only this recommendation but what 
others might come about based on other plea options. I don't 
think there's anything in the report, Your Honor, that says 
anything in relation to the facts that were admitted between 
the parties. So I've asked for that to be part of the record 
as well and based upon that, Your Honor, we'll submit to the 
Court. However, my client would like to give a final 
statement. 
Additionally, Your Honor, Ben's mom, Deborah 
McLenachen - it's spelled differently, Your Honor - would 
like to say a few words today and also Larry Rettig, father 
of Ben would like to say a few words today, Your Honor, and 
then we'll submit to the Court. 
THE COURT: All right. The last name is pronounced 
McClanigan? 
MR. FACEMYER: McLenachen. 
THE COURT: McLenachen. 
Ms. McLenachen, if you're here, if you'd like to 
come forward. 
Good afternoon, how are you? The podium is yours 
for a moment and if you don't mind, I know you've got a 
letter here, I could probably find the spelling - there is 
it. It's M-C-L-E-N-A-C-H-E-N? 
MS. MCLENACHEN: That's correct. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. What would you 
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like me to know? 
MS. MCLENACHEN: I just wrote a short statement. I 
would like to express love and compassion for all who have 
been affected by the murder of Kay Mortensen. It has and 
will continue to impact the lives of many and very 
devastating and life changing to some. The echos of our 
every actionr both high and low, touch many, not only those 
directly affected. There are many victims in this room. 
Ben, I speak for everyone in your family when I tell you 
that we love you very much. You are and will continue to be 
a -
THE COURT: Ms. -
MS. MCLENACHEN: - very much a part of our lives. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you, Ms. McLenachen. 
I apologize for interrupting - we're just normally 
not allowed to speak to the inmates here. Thank you. I 
understand he's your son. 
Larry Rettig? Good afternoon, Mr. Rettig. 
MR. RETTIG: Good afternoon, Your Honor, and thank 
you for these few moments I'd like to take and address the 
Court and address the family and also address the community 
of Utah County. 
I feel today that I've failed as a father because 
one of my six children failed to act appropriately. But 
today he stands before you to take responsibility for his 
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inaction. Even though he was under duress at the time, he 
had opportunity to take another path. He just couldn't find 
it to do it. We love him very much and we will be there 
whenever he does come back to society. 
I know that there's nothing that I can say to the 
family community that can change their minds from the sound 
bytes that they received over the radio, from television or 
the newspaper, but know this, that he, from my letter that 
you stated earlier that you read, that he had traveled a lot 
because of my position working in the United States Army for 
20 years and that gave him a ground that I thought was stable 
and stable enough to make the correct choice at the right 
time. He even thought himself to join the Army as a medic and 
now his life is not over but just beginning in another path 
that I and his family members would never saw him choose to 
take. We feel that even though he'll he 49 wh~n he's 
eligible, maybe, if the parole will let him, or later, that 
he will not be a threat to the community. He will be a 
productive person in society. There's things that he can do 
while he's on the inside that we understand that lead to that 
direction. 
And again, I just wanted the Court to know and the 
Parole Board later on, if I'm not there, that my son made the 
wrong decision. But today he is standing up and taking 
responsibility and be accountable for his actions and that we 
10 
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love him very much. 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you Mr. Rettig, appreciate that. 
Is that it Mr. Facemyer until .. 
MR. FACEMYER: It is. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
Mr. Taylor. 
MR. TAYLOR: Judge, we have four individuals who 
we'd like to just briefly have address the Court. The first 
one will be Roger Mortensen. 
THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Mortensen. 
MR. MORTENSEN: Good afternoon, sir. 
THE COURT: Thank you for coming today. 
MR. MORTENSEN: Thank you for having us. The last 
time I was in the presence of this man he held a gun at my 
head. My father, Kay S. MortP.ns~n, worked hard his whole, 
entire life. He was in good health. Mr. Rettig robbed him 
of his retirement years that he so rightfully deserved. 
From my understanding, my father cooperated 
completely with Mr. Rettig, so why was it necessary to take 
his life? He was the one standing there holding the gun. 
Why didn't he use that opportunity to stop Bond? Why didn't 
he overpower him and stop all these crimes? He stood by and 
watched as me and my wife, two innocently accused people were 
falsely accused and incarcerated for a crime that he himself 
11 
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committed. His involvement and decisions he made that night 
set in motion a horrible chain of events, the effect of which 
may never be undone. My wife lost her job. Our vehicles were 
taken. Our_reputations were ruined and our relationship with 
family have been forever destroyed. For many months we lived 
in fear that our lives would be taken as Mr. Rettig told us 
he would come by and kill us. Our lives were destructed 
because of nothing we did. Our incarceration - his 
incarceration is solely due to the actions and choices he 
made on November 16th of 2 0 0 9. 
I hope that he is in prison for the rest of his 
entire life so that he can have lots of time to think about 
the actions he has and how he has affected many, many 
innocent lives. This is something that I don't know how can 
be done with but it's been a terrible experience. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank yoll vP.ry much, Mr~ 
Mortensen, appreciate that. 
MR. TAYLOR: Kay's sister (inaudible) . 
THE COURT: I'm sorry, what's the name, Mr. 
MR. TAYLOR: (Inaudible) . 
THE COURT: Vern Hicken? 
MR. TAYLOR: Fern. 
THE COURrr: Fern? Thank you and what's the 
name? 
Taylor? 
last 
MS. MAY: My name is Fern May and Kay was my oldest 
12 
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brother. Thank you, Your Honor, for this opportunity. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MS. MAY: Your Honor, I would plead for you to 
impose the maximum possible sentence for Ben Rettig and that 
he never, ever be released. There should not any hint of 
leniency shown. He committed an act of cold blooded murder. 
Ben Rettig did not have to go down that murderous path. He 
had every opportunity to change what was going to happen that 
night and he chose not to. He chose a blood soaked path. 
Now he deserves to be punished with the maximum sentence 
possible in keeping with the heinous nature of his crime. 
Ben· Rettig proved that he's greedy, selfish, murdering 
and he's a coward. In the hopes of financial gain he in cold 
blood murdered a good, God-fearing, brilliant man. He held 
two people hostage, victimized and terrorized them. He acted 
like a coward for over n year while these two same people who 
were unjustly arrested and held in jail for a crime they did 
not commit. He's one of the lowliest forms of human life, 
one who does not deserve to take another breath as a free 
man. In fact every breath he takes is one more breath than 
he deserves and one more breath that Kay should have had an 
opportunity to take. 
I hope in the many decades that he spends in 
prison, the nightmare of that night will haunt him every 
night. I hope that he will wake up every night in horror 
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knowing that he is ~esponsible for the horrific, brutal 
murder of my brother, my mentor, my friend. 
Kay's and my father died when I was 13 and Kay as 
my oldest brother became my s~rrogate father. He advised and 
counseled me. He helped me through difficult times my whole 
life. Additionally, Kay and I became co-guardians of our 
disabled brother, Neil. Kay and I worked closely together to 
arrange care for Neil and to watch over him. Now Neil 
doesn't have his big brother to watch over him and I'm left 
alone to be the sole guardian of my disabled brother. 
Countless times over the past two years I have 
yearned to talk with Kay, to get his advice and counsel and 
guidance, to laugh with him and to make memories with him and 
his wonderful wife Darla. Instead, we as a family are left 
with a gaping hole. Our family was ripped apart. It will, 
as Roger mentioned, irreparable damage has been done that 
will never, ever be repaired. We have suffered an 
irreparable and irreplaceable loss. 
I feel sorrow and sadness for Ben Rettig's family, 
for I know they suffer and grieve because of his selfish and 
cowardly actions. 
Again, Your Honor, I'd plea for you to impose the 
maximum possible sentence. There should not be any leniency 
shown. He should never be released to breathe a breath of 
fresh air as a free man. This was cold blooded murder by a 
14 
.... - .. -··-----.. -- - ·-·- . , .... ··• ..... __ .......... ___ .. _. ________ .......... . .... -·· ... ,- .... , ..... - ....... -....... ___ -------~--- ...................... - - .. . 
C: l;J!il 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
coward. 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you, Ms. May. 
MR. TAYLOR: Two more Judge. We have Paul 
Mortensen, Kay's son. 
THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Mortensen. 
MR. MORTENSEN: I also have one from my sister, 
Julie. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. MORTENSEN: My name is Paul Mortensen, Kay is 
my father. In preparation of writing this I've come to 
realize that I'll never be able to fully express or 
comprehend the ramifications of how the murder of my father 
has or will impact my life and the lives of my family. My 
father worked very hard his whole life. He had just returned 
from serving a mission and was looking for.war.d to enjoying 
his retirement with his beloved wife, Darla. He has been 
taken from both them. It's been two years since my dad was 
taken from us and I'm still trying to work through the 
adjustments of not having him in my life. I'm 35 years old 
and I feel like I have wasted most of those years in 
disagreements. My father and I had just started working out 
our differences and were beginning to build a relationship 
that we both had and always needed and wanted. Today I'm 
mourning the loss of what that relationship would have 
15 
--------
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
--···•··---·--··-·--------------- ···---~-·-.,·-------------. 
become. 
My father has always lived his life with a no fear 
mentality. But I often find myself thinking about the fear, 
disappointment and helplessness he must have been feeling 
during the last moments of his life. The taking of my 
father's life has created havoc in the relationships between 
some of my family members, some of which are beyond repair. 
I am mourning the loss of my father never getting to meet or 
be in the lives of my future children. He had such great 
knowledge that I would have loved for him to pass onto my 
kids. I find it inconceivable that anyone could put the 
value of worldly possessions higher than the life of my dad. 
He had so much to offer this world. My perception of people 
has changed. I used to think people were generally 
trustworthy and that they were safe in our own homes. I will 
never feel that way again. 
This is from my sister, Julie. 
"My life has changed so much since the day my 
father was ripped out of my life. He was such a good man and 
I miss him so much. I will never forget that phone call to 
tell me the unbelievable news. He was always there for me 
when I needed him. There wasn't a week that went by that we 
didn't talk on the phone. He always told me that he loved 
me. The shocking violence of his death has really affected 
my children. My daughters have nightmares and are afraid of 
16 
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bad people coming into our house. My youngest daughter had 
to be put into counseling to help her deal with it. They are 
afraid of so many things now that they weren't afraid of 
before, including zip ties because that's what was used to 
restrain their grandpa before he was murdered. 
"My dad had finally found true happiness in his 
life because of his new wife, Darla. They had so many plans 
for the future, for their future together. The tragic life 
of my father is huge for me and my family. It is a terrible 
tragedy and just so sad." 
Mortensen. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much, Mr. 
MR. TAYLOR: And lastly, Darla Mortensen. 
THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon. 
MS. MORTENSEN: I just want to go on the record as 
say:i.ng that I object to Ben Rettig getting life with chance 
of parole. I don't think he should ever be released from 
prison. I don't know for sure. We're told he didn't do the 
actual killing, he says he didn't, but it doesn't matter, he 
participated in a brutal, heartless murder that was just 
senseless and it destroyed so many lives that night. 
And when I was told they weren't using drugs; they 
weren't using alcohol; that made it worse to me that they 
could go in and commit such a crime. They knew what they were 
doing and I was told that Kay had showed them where the guns 
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were out in the bunker, a few guns. They took him out there 
and then they immediately killed him after that. They didn't 
even get his guns. His g~ns were in our bedroom, his 
priceless guns. They didn't take them. It doesn't make 
sense. Why couldn't they have just taken these guns and 
left? Why did they have to kill him in such a brutal way? I 
think th~y had murder on their minds when they went there 
that night, that that was more important than what they ~ 
stole. 
Kay was healthy, he never was sick from the day I 
met him. The years that I knew him he worked hard all his 
life. He didn't do things that were that fun. He had a farm 
that tied him. After we got married he sold these farms. He 
sold his house and he was free to travel for the first time 
in 20 years. 
HP. had a lot of personal struggles earlier in his 
life and he was working on making amends to broken 
relationships and he was making progress. 
We met a few years ago and got married and we just 
had a great time together. We were very happy. He told me 
many times it was the happiest he'd ever been in his life. 
We went and took a dance class at BYU and we went to dances 
and we took a cruise to Hawaii. We went hiking and bike 
riding and went on picnics and we just felt young and alive. 
We served an 18-month mission and we'd only been off that 
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mission for three weeks. We thought now we can go have fun 
and travel, when this horrible thing happened. He didn't 
want to die. He wasn't ready to die. He didn't want to. He 
wanted to live and so the life that I knew is totally gone 
and I feel anxiety every day. I don't feel safe any more. I 
don't trust people like I used to. There's never a day that 
goes by that I just don't dwell on what has happened and I 
can't sleep at night and I just don't feel like I'm the 
person that I used to be and that life will never be the same 
for me again. 
And I'm not a hateful person. I don't hate Ben. I 
look at him, I don't hate him. I feel sad for his family. 
He seems to have a very nice family. They've lost their son 
and brother and I hope he doesn't have the opportunity to get 
out and marry and have a family and have a normal life 
because he did makP. t.hat decision. He went with Martin Bond 
that day and he participated in a murder. And how many 
people are capable of murder in this world? Not very many I 
don't think, but he did it and I feel like he has to pay the 
price. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Ms. Mortensen. 
MR. TAYLOR: Thank you, Judge. Just a couple of 
things to finish up with. There are some restitution 
requests as the Court has seen from the Crime Victims 
Reparation and we would ask that you impose that and that be 
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a joint and several in the event that Mr. Bond is convicted 
of this also. 
The only issue, Judge, that you, I mean, you've 
seen the agreement and the only issue that we left up to the 
Court right now is whether or not it's consecutive or 
concurrent. As part of our agreement the State did agree to 
recommend concurrent sentence with regard to the aggravated 
murder and the aggravated kidnaping and so we will stand by 
that but I think you need to make that decision today, 
whether or not to impose that. 
Other than that, Judge, I think that's all we have, 
so we'll submit it. 
THE COURT: Can I just ask you, is there anything 
you can state on the record as to why you're recommending the 
25 to life? 
MR. TAYT,OR: We 11, the 2 5 to life with regards to 
the aggravated murder is the statutory limit. So we agreed 
that as part of his sentence he does have the possibility -
that we would recommend and I think we even went back and ran 
this past the Court beforehand, but that we would agree to 
life with the possibility of parole. But with regards to the 
25 to life, that's the statutory. 
THE COURT: I'm just wondering. Is there anything 
you can state on the record regarding why you're making that 
recommendation and why that was the agreement? 
20 
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MR. TAYLOR: You mean with regards to the 
possibility of parole? 
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. TAYLOR: Without going into all the evidence 
and stuff, Judge, that we have in this case -
THE COURT: I understand it places you in a spot. 
I'm just asking for anything you can say on the record. 
MR. TAYLOR: Urnmm, Judge, there - Mr. Rettig did 
agree to assist us in the prosecution of Mr. Bond if he so 
asked, we'll subpoena him. So receiving that assistance was 
something we took into consideration with regards to this. 
We also - we felt very strongly all along that Mr. Bond 
was actually the one who, who actually committed the murder. 
Although I talk about how Mr. Rettig was there, we've always 
felt that Mr. Bond was the who actually held the knife. So, 
although I did argue against, you know, that he was a less 
active participant with regards to that one crime, it was 
that one aspect of the crime. Everything leading up to and 
surrounding that crime, he was a full participant. But, we 
felt that because of those things in regard to his assisting 
us and that he actually isn't the one who held the knife in 
his hand, those are the reasons as to why we agreed. 
THE COURT: Do you mind if I just ask and if you 
can't respond, I understand, has Mr. Rettig negatively 
affected his usefulness to the prosecution based on the 
--------------------·-·---·•---·--• ---·------------ ,,, ·•·. 
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correspondence that he had written previously to the Court? 
MR. TAYLOR: Ummrn, no, Judge, because my 
understanding that the correspondence had to do with a 
certain portion of the factual basis. He was taking issue 
with regards to that. But with regards to his position as to 
his interview with the police, his written statement, those 
have been consistent with regards to actually whose the one 
who committed the crime and obviously it's tough to know but, 
we are absolutely confident that we have the right person who 
committed the crime. So we feel that him being an eyewitness 
to this crime, being up there when Martin Bond killed Kay 
Mortensen, that he actually is and can be very useful. 
Whether he agrees to participate and assist us in the future, 
that's yet to be seen. But with regards to his usefulness, I 
don't think it (inaudible) issue. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
Mr. Rettig? 
MR. FACEMYER: Come on up, Ben. 
THE COURT: Mr. Rettig. 
MR. FACEMYER: May I at least address the questions 
of the prosecution, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. FACEMYER: Your Honor, in the charge at hand, 
the charge at hand which is aggravated murder, aggravated 
kidnaping, first degrees, the recommendation is for the 
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statutory provision and the plea agreement that was made 
between the defendant, his attorneys at the time, Ms. Esplin 
and their team and Mr. Taylor and their team, came to this 
conclusion of with a parole opportunity and so I understand 
why the Court asked that but I think when you do categories 
of what a person is pleading to, I think you need - when you 
have this aggravated murder, first degree, I think the facts 
support the charge and therefore, it was appropriate to move 
in that fashion and my client felt that as well. 
My concern with the Court in regar~s to the letter 
that my client sent to the Court, is the Court referring to a 
request to withdraw letter? Is that what the Court is 
referring to? 
THE COURT: It is. 
MR. FACEMYER: Your Honor, I would explain to the 
Court, in my discussions with Mr. Rettig which I went into in 
great detail, I think his misunderstanding of the application 
of certain legal terminologies, explained to him while 
incarcerated from jailhouse lawyers, brought him along a path 
that he was under a false impression on what the law was and 
when I discussed with him not only the law, I first discussed 
with him the facts and in my factual scenario with him I gave 
him opportunity to discuss pure facts with me. That's all I 
wanted, what was he saying was the issues involved in that 
letter specifically. 
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After he then gave me the facts, Your Honor, I went 
to my office, I drafted an affidavit, I went back to the 
jail, I talked to him at length about the affidavit. I had 
him read the affidavit. I said, is there anything 
additional? Is there anything more? Is there anything I need 
to add? Is there anything I need to subtract? I gave him 
numerous opportunities to adjust his facts that frankly, Your 
Honor, might have helped him, and he didn't. He read the 
facts and said, this is accurate, this is true and then I 
explained to him issues, legal issues in relation to coercion 
and duress and things of that nature and then I explained to 
him why in my professional opinion those arguments that he 
was told and could have some understanding of, why those 
arguments weren't wholly accurate with the people explaining 
those to him. I explained to him what the law was and also 
how those facts that he provided me fit into the category of 
where we were. 
He never, ever in my experience with him attempted 
to deviate from what he was saying the whole time but he did 
want information and I think in his letter to the Court, 
that's what he was really seeking, for definitive answers 
upon these issues and I resolved those issues and I resolved 
them without, without brow-beating experience, frankly, Your 
Honor. It was very candid, very open, with office staff with 
me as well and I think they would say the same, that even 
24 
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given opportunity to maybe make adjustments and changes in 
factual scenario, he chose not to even without request. He 
just chose not to and stuck with what he understood, or what 
his memory gave him. And so I don't think that that letter 
in itself has any effect on this. I think we're here before 
the Court today as we stated last week after going through 
those legal arguments that were presented to him - and this 
Court practiced law for a long time and they know what 
persons who are incarcerated sometimes come up with when 
people give them theories in case, from fellow incarcerated 
parties who just don't really have an understanding of the 
law as they should. And so questions are asked and now I've 
been able to provide answers to questions and he has acted I 
think, consistent with the plea as is proposed and in moving 
forward in the case as well. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Rettig, this is now 
your opportunity to make any statement that you would like 
to. 
DEFENDANT RETTIG: I could sit up here and debate 
the case but that would just be out of line and unnecessary. 
I just want to apologize to the Mortensen family for what 
happened and it could be said that my actions following the 
crime could be depicted as remorseless and having not a 
conscience, but I think not being associated with Mr. Bond 
after the fact shows that I was in fact remorseful for what 
25 
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happened and I just want to say that I'm truly sorry and, I 
know I - I'm just really sorry about what happened. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
Anything else, Mr. Facemyer? 
MR. FACEMYER: No, Your Honor, we'll submit to the 
Court. 
THE COURT: All right. I'm going to take just a 
brief recess. I'll be right back out, thank you. 
MR. FACEMYER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Whereupon a recess was taken) 
THE COURT: Please have a seat. Appreciate your 
patience, apologize for the delay. We're back on the record, 
are we ready to proceed? 
MR. TAYLOR: Judge, may. I just say one thing? 
THE COURT: Yeah, go ahead. 
MR. TAYI~R: With regards to aggravated kidnaping 
and we didn't address that, under the statute, aggravated 
kidnaping is not less than 15 years which may be for life and 
so if you are looking to deviate from that, the requirement 
is that it has to be in the interest of justice and then you 
put that on the record, so if you are, we would just ask that 
you go ahead and put that (inaudible). 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. FACEMYER: Can we approach, Your Honor'? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
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(W~ereupon a sidebar was held as follows: 
MR. FACEMYER: Your Honor, I know I came in late in 
this game here. I was instructed that this case was 
(inaudible) aggravated murder and aggravated kidnaping 
prosecution {inaudible) understanding of what it was which 
was concurrent. My understanding also was that this was a 
Rule (inaudible) before the court. 
THE COURT: I think you're right. 
MR. FACEMYER: Okay. (Inaudible) you know, I don't 
know if the matter - (Inaudible) discussed the matter 
(inaudible) sentence would be life with parole opportunity 
[inaudible]. 
MR. TAYLOR: Yeah, you're right. 
(End of sidebar) 
THE COURT: I have appreciated the testimony I've 
been provided today from all the concerned. I especially 
appreciate the insights I've received regarding Professor 
Mortensen from his family. The focus of this case has been 
about the events of November 19, 2009 and about Mr. Rettig 
and it was good to finally hear about Professor Mortensen and 
about the life that he was living when it was so abruptly 
taken from him. 
Mr. Rettig, from the letters written by your 
friends and acquaintances, you're a peaceful, kind and 
helpful person. You declined apparently at one point to join 
27 
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the armed services because you didn't feel capable of taking 
another's life. You frequently sacrificed your own personal 
comfort or welfare to help others with their comfort or 
welfare. But even from your versio~ of this offense, you let 
another individual persuade you to commit a burglary and then 
you ended up helping that person take the life of someone who 
had never done you any wrong. You traveled a long way to 
Payson that day and you had plenty of time to rethink things. 
You even spent at least some time in Professor Mortensen's 
home with him and yet that empathy and helpfulness that your 
friends and family all found in you throughout your life, 
were unfortunately totally absent at that critical time in 
yours and Professor Mortensen's life. 
For some minutes from the moment that you accepted 
the gun from Mr. Bond, according to your version of the 
offense, you were the most powerful person in Professor 
Mortensen's home. Everybody's fate rested in your hands. 
You could have used that gun and the power that it conveyed 
to protect Professor Mortensen or you could have used it to 
empower Mr. Bond to commit murder. You chose the latter and 
now his family has lost a husband and father and we as a 
society have lost a talented, valuable and good human being 
and now you are going to lose what should have been the best 
years of your life. 
A more innocent victim would be hard to find. 
28 
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1 Professor Mortensen had the right to enjoy his retirement 
2· years with his wife and his family, he had earned that and 
3 
4 
his family is justified to be outraged and to demand the most 
severe punishment possible. Roger and Pamela Mortensen on 
5 their own behalf, they are victims of the kidnaping count in 
6 this case in their own right and they also have the right to 
7 be outraged. 
8 In conclusion, however, I do find your father's 
9 words instructive. He's characterized himself as a failure 
10 in letter and here in court because of your deeds. I think 
11 . all of our deeds live on in our children. While you may not 
12 have accepted any of the guns that were stolen from Professor 
13 Mortensen's home and while you may not have associated with 
14 Mr. Bond after this event, you did stand by while others were 
15 being prosecuted for your crimes and you made many other 
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morally reprehensible decisions. 
However, once your secret was discovered by law 
enforcement, you did show complete cooperation. You 
confessed your role, you did not require that the State put 
forth any evidence at all of your guilt to obtain these 
convictions. Instead, you willing accepted them and you did 
not require that Roger or Pamela relive the horror of those 
moments by testifying. You've granted the family the only 
real gift that now you could give, and that is closure. 
There is value in that and it reflects your father's words 
29 
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that you are today taking the responsibility that you failed 
to take two years ago. 
Also, I do want to indicate to the Mortensen 
family, I do not know Professor Mortensen as well as you. I 
only know them through what I've heard from you and from what 
he was doing with his life in the months before it was taken. 
But from the little I have learned and what I know about 
Professor Mortensen, I can't help but believe that if he were 
here today, he would advocate that whatever sentence is 
imposed, leaves some hope of salvaging a portion of Mr. 
Rettig's life. 
Therefore, based on all the evidence presented, the 
Court will impose a sentence that is recommended by the State 
and by Adult Probation and Parole of an indeterminate term of 
not less than 25 years and which may be for life at the Utah 
State Prison for the convi~tion of aggravated murder, a non-
capital, first degree felony; and 15 years and which maybe 
for life for aggravated kidnaping to be served concurrently, 
a fine of $10,000 on each count will be imposed to be paid 
according to the desires of the parole board. 
Restitution is ordered in the amount of $10,671.71 
to Crime Victims Reparations. 
Mr. Rettig, I suspect that by the time a Parole 
Board at some point in the distant future is deciding whether 
or not you should be released back into the community, I will 
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no longer be a judge and Mr. Facemyer will no long be an 
attorney and neither will Mr. Taylor. This is not likely. 
In fact, it's unlikely that anybody currently serving on the 
Parole Board will still be there when you're being discussed 
for possible release. The next generation will decide your 
fate. My order is merely allowing them to do so. But if you 
don't mind, since this is probably the last time that I will 
ever see you, I would like to take a moment of judicial 
privilege and.give you some counsel; is that all right? 
When you helped take Professor Mortensen's life you 
deprived his family and all of us of a good man, an influence 
for good in this world and you replaced it with a duty to 
take care of you now at our expense for a good long time. 
You've given up your future for a good long time. I would 
hope that you recognize the duty that you have not just to 
live for yourself, but to try to somehow rRplace that good 
that you've taken. Your power to do good in prison isn't 
very much. By necessity we're having to confine you so you 
can't do anything bad and also means you can't do much good, 
at least a lot less than you probably could have done on the 
outside with a life well lived. What I'm asking you to do is 
to find something, some way to replace the goodness that 
you've taken so this isn't such a complete and total 
disastrous loss for society, for this community, for Mr. 
Mortensen's family. Good luck to you sir. Thank you. 
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MR. FACEMYER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
{Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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